

An Assessment of Georgian Civil Society (2005)

STRONG COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN A
CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT

CIVICUS CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX SHORTENED ASSESSMENT TOOL
REPORT FOR GEORGIA

Editor in chief: Ghia Nodia

Author: Paata Gurgенidze

Tbilisi 2005

Centre for Training and Consultancy

CIVICUS Civil Society Index

An international action-research project coordinated by CIVICUS:
World Alliance for Citizen Participation

FOREWORD

The Centre for Training and Consultancy (CTC) is a civil society organisation (CSO) that was established in 1999 to contribute to the increased impact of development intervention on progress towards a humane, open and just society in Georgia.

Since its creation, CTC has played an important role in Georgian CSOs' networks by setting an example of high management standards. Initially it acted mainly as a provider of consultancy and training in the field of participatory planning and management to other developmental organisations and institutions. In the future, CTC intends to reinforce its profile as a civil society resource centre of a wider scope rather than just a provider of supporting services.

We understand civil society as a space of continuous dialogue and interaction among different stakeholders. Civil society is based on participatory decision making and transparent processes and CTC strives to facilitate the dialogue as well as support the actors involved.

This understanding stipulated one of the CTC's major strategic directions, which is to strengthen the impact of civic society organisations on broader society by creating synergies for result-oriented action and supporting public discourse processes for the exchange of ideas and consensus-building among civil society actors.

In this regard, one of the main goals for CTC is to monitor the level of civil society development through conducting regular assessments according to the Civil Society Index method developed by CIVICUS.

This project has been carried out together with collaborators from the United Nations Association of Georgia and colleagues from Stakeholder Assessment Group representing various organisations of the Georgian civic sector as well as the government, academia and business. We hope that all these people involved will make possible not only continuity of the given project but cooperate further for the country's civil society development in the context of other projects as well.

Irina Khantadze

Director of the Centre for Training and Consultancy

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI -SAT) was carried out by the Centre for Training and Consultancy. The project's approach and research methodology was developed by the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The study as well as its publication was supported financially by CORDAID (Netherlands).

The Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) of the project assisted with the implementation of the CSI-SAT from the outset. I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of the group's members for the time and energy they put into the project: Zaur Khalilov of Civil Integration Foundation; Nana Kakabadze of Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights; Manana Ghurchumelidze of Georgian Teachers' Independent Trade Union "Solidaroba"; Lela Kartvelishvili of Evangelist-Baptist church; Levan Kharatishvili of Civil Initiatives' Centre; Manana Javakhishvili of Dynamic Psychology for Development and Democracy; Lela Khomeriki of International Centre for Civil Culture; Bela Tsipuria - deputy Minister of Education and Science; Ia Tikanadze of Friedrich Ebert Foundation ; Nino Durglishvili of Tbilisi State University; Eka Kvesitadze of daily newspaper – "24 Hours".

I would also like to thank all the people who helped us organise and provided premises for the SAG meetings.

Special thanks to Mr. Ghia Nodia, who edited the report and participated in the entire project as the Civil Society Expert (CSE).

I managed the CSI-SAT project at CTC and prepared the draft report. However, the completion of the project would not have been possible without the cooperation and support of Irma Alpenidze and Irakli Kutsia - colleagues at CTC, and without the assistance of the UNAG researchers - Nana Tsereteli, Marina Imerlishvili, and Ketii Kharatishvili - who provided invaluable support in collecting data and drafting the report.

This report draws on ideas, arguments and examples brought up during the course of the work of the SAG, discussions with colleagues at CTC, and the National Scoring Seminar which was held at the end of project to discuss and build upon its findings. All these stakeholders and participants contributed strongly to this report. Last but not least, I would like to thank the CSI team in CIVICUS, above all Volkhart Finn Heinrich, for their support throughout the project and for the invaluable input and comments to the pre-final version of this report.

Paata Gurgenidze

Director of the project

Centre for Training and Consultancy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD	
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
TABLE OF CONTENTS	
TABLES AND FIGURES	
LIST OF ACRONYMS	
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
INTRODUCTION	
I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX SHORTENED ASSESSMENT TOOL BACKGROUND AND APPROACH.....	10
1. PROJECT BACKGROUND.....	10
2. PROJECT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY	11
2.1 Conceptual Framework	11
2.2 Project Methodology.....	12
2.3 Linking Research With Action.....	13
2.4 Project Outputs.....	14
II CIVIL SOCIETY IN GEORGIA	15
1. HISTORY OF GEORGIA’S CIVIL SOCIETY	15
2. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY USED IN THIS STUDY	20
3. MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN GEORGIA	21
III ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY	24
1. STRUCTURE	24
1.1. Breadth of Citizen Participation.....	24
1.2. Depth of Citizen Participation	27
1.3. Diversity of Civil Society Participants.....	27
1.4. Level of Organization.	28
1.5. Inter-relations.....	30
1.6. Resources	31
Conclusion	33
2. ENVIRONMENT	34
2.1. Political Context.....	34
2.2. Basic Freedoms and Rights.....	38
2.3. Socio-Economic Context	40
2.4. Socio-Cultural Context.....	42
2.5. Legal Environment.....	43
2.6. State-Civil Society Relations	44
2.7. Private Sector-Civil Society Relations.....	46
Conclusion	47
3. VALUES	49
3.1. Democracy.....	49
3.2. Transparency.....	51
3.3 Tolerance.....	52
3.4. Non-violence	53
3.5. Gender Equity	54
3.6. Poverty Eradication.....	55
3.7. Environmental sustainability.....	55
Conclusion	56
4. IMPACT	58
4.1 Influencing Public Policy.....	58
4.2. Holding state and private corporations accountable.....	60
4.3. Responding to social interests	62
4.4. Empowering citizens.....	64
4.5. Meeting societal needs	67
Conclusion	70
IV CONCLUSION	72
APPENDICES	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY	91

TABLES AND FIGURES

Table

Table I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-2005	10
Table II.2.1: Types of CSOs included in the study	21
Table III.1.1: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation	25
Table III.1.3: Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants	27
Table III.1.4: Registered CSOs in Georgia	28
Table III.1.5: Indicators assessing level of organisation	28
Table III.1.6: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society	30
Table III.1.7: Indicators assessing civil society resources	31
Table III.2.1: Indicators Assessing Political Context	34
Table III.2.2: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms	38
Table III.2.3: Indicator assessing socio-economic context	40
Table III.2.4: Indicator assessing socio-cultural context	42
Table III.2.5: Indicators assessing legal environment	43
Table III.2.6: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations	44
Table III.2.7: Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations	46
Table III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy	49
Table III.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency	50
Table III.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance	52
Table III.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence	53
Table III.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equality	54
Table III.3.6: Indicator assessing power eradication	55
Table III.3.7: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability	56
Table III.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing public policy	58
Table III.4.3: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable	60
Table III.4.4: Indicators assessing responding to social interests	62
Table III.4.5: Indicators assessing Empowering citizens	64
Table III.4.6: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs	68
Table III.4.7: Service delivery CSOs priority areas	69
Table III.4.8: Types of CSOs services	69

FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Civil Society Diamond for Georgia	6
FIGURE I.1.1: Civil society diamond tool	12
FIGURE II.3.1: Social Forces Map	22
FIGURE II.3.2: Civil Society Map	23
FIGURE III.1.1: Subdimension scores in structure dimension	24
FIGURE III.1.2: The most acceptable form of participation to influence the government	25
FIGURE III.1.3: Participation in collective actions before and since Rose Revolution	26
FIGURE III.1.4: Geographical distribution of CSOs' activities	28
FIGURE III.1.5: Personal computers in Georgian CSOs	32
FIGURE III.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension	34
FIGURE III.2.2: TI CPI Georgia	36
FIGURE III.2.3: WBI Governance Indicator –Government effectiveness	37
FIGURE III.2.4: WBI Georgia-Selected Economic Indicators, 2000-2004	41
FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension	49
FIGURE III.3.2: Practice of financial audit in CSOs (Nodia, G., 2005, pp. 75-39)	51
FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension	58
FIGURE III.4.2: Advocacy (NGOSI, 2004)	59
FIGURE III.4.3: Public perception of Georgian NGOs activities	63
FIGURE III.4.4: Public perception of corruption of various institutions	64
FIGURE III.4.5: Service Provision (NGOSI, 2004)	68


LIST OF ACRONYMS

BP	British Petroleum
CBC	Community Building Centre
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSI-SAT	Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
CSRDG	Centre for Strategic Research and Development of Georgia
CIDCM	Centre for International Development and Conflict Management
CTC	Centre for Training and Consultancy
EDPRP	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith Based Organizations
FPPHR	Former political prisoners for Human Rights
GCMi	Georgia Community Mobilisation Initiative
GDP	Gross domestic product
GL	Georgian Lari
HR	Human Rights
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IT	Information Technologies
LSG	Local Self-Government
NCO	National Coordinating Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NNO	Non-state nonprofit organisation
NPO	Nonprofit organisation
NSS	National Scoring Seminar
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAG	Stakeholder Assessment Group
SOS	SOS Children's Village
UN	United Nations
UNAG	United Nations Association of Georgia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WVS	World Values Survey
YEDI	Young Entrepreneur Development Initiative

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the course of 2005, the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) project collected information and secondary data on the state of civil society in Georgia. Using a comprehensive framework of 68 indicators and drawing on extensive data collected by the project team, the Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) assessed the overall state of civil society in Georgia. The results are summarised in a visual graph below (see figure 1), known as the Civil Society Diamond, which looks at four dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, environment, values and impact. The Georgian diamond reveals a medium-level structure of civil society with somewhat limited values and moderate impact, against the background of a somewhat weak and hindering environment.

FIGURE 1: Civil Society Diamond for Georgia



The CSI-SAT project brought to light many new insights with regards to the current state of civil society in Georgia, which are briefly summarised below.

The in-depth examination of civil society's **structure** in Georgia showed certain weaknesses as well as strengths. Taking into account that the development of civil society in Georgia has been strongly supported by foreign assistance, it did not come as a surprise that

citizen participation is low, while inter-relations among civil society actors are good and their resources sufficient. The level of diversity among civil society participants appeared relatively high and CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country. It was also interesting to learn that, despite years of foreign donor support, the organisational development of the sector is rather weak. Only a small minority of CSOs belong to an umbrella body; some attempts at CSO self-regulation are in place, but by far not all CSOs adhere to them, and only a handful of "elite" CSOs have international linkages outside the Caucasus region. However, a reasonable support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and it is expanding. This infrastructure, together with the available resources is a sufficient base for civil society's structure in Georgia and for further efforts to strengthen it in the future.

Environment is the weakest dimension of civil society in Georgia. The environment in which civil society operates can be regarded as slightly disabling and hindering civil society's further development. The most negative aspect of this dimension is the political context. This is due to certain restrictions on the political participation of citizens, weak institutionalization and weak internal democracy of political parties, poor development of the rule of law, substantial corruption, low state effectiveness and underdeveloped decentralization. Additionally, the project noted weaknesses in the realization of basic civic rights, low levels of social tolerance and weak relations between civil society and the private sector. However,

CSOs can rely on some positive external factors, such as fairly good legislation that regulates their activities, and a rather autonomous position and some space for dialogue with the State.

The CSI-SAT assessed civil society's **values** as rather positive. However, the analysis of democracy, gender equity and transparency within CSOs shows that they do not always practice what they preach. Another weakness is that CSOs do not pay sufficient attention to the issue of poverty eradication in Georgia. This could be explained by the fact that, in the post-Communist environment, the value of social justice and equality has been largely discredited. Nevertheless, robust values of Georgian civil society, especially with regards to tolerance, non-violence, and environmental sustainability promotion, provide a solid basis on which other dimensions of civil society can be strengthened in Georgia.

Looking at civil society's **impact**, Georgian civil society seems to have a rather strong role in attempts to hold the state accountable, respond to social interests and empower citizens. At the same time, the country's civil society is less effective when influencing public policy and trying to meet societal needs directly. The latter corresponds to the lack of focus on poverty eradication, while the failure to influence public policy may be linked to the political context, which does not allow for any substantive policy engagement by civil society.

For the first time for Georgian civil society, a comprehensive and participatory assessment of civil society has been carried out through the CSI-SAT project. Its findings seek to contribute to charting the way for civil society's progress in the years to come. As the CSI-SAT study has found, the further development of civil society in Georgia will require a focus on structural issues, such as low levels citizen participation and the weak organisation of the sector. The lack of attention to poverty eradication and social justice is another important concern for civil society. Future efforts in these areas, together with an improvement of the political context, could lead to greater impact by civil society with regards to influencing public policy as well as meeting societal needs directly.

This project seeks to provide Georgian civil society with a roadmap for its future development. The hope is that the interactive nature of the CSI-SAT project will make its results credible in the eyes of civil society actors and other stakeholders, and that they will act upon its findings to make Georgian civil society stronger and more sustainable in the future.

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the results of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT) in Georgia, carried out from March to November 2005, as part of the international CSI project coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. Since 1999, CIVICUS has been working on the Civil Society Index (CSI) project. The CSI is a comprehensive participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society actors at country level, which is currently being implemented in more than 50 countries around the world.

In 2004, CIVICUS developed the CIVICUS Civil Society Index – Shortened Assessment Tool (CSI-SAT), a shorter, less comprehensive and less resource-intensive process to assess the state of civil society, which is based on the original CSI design. The CSI-SAT aims to: 1) generate relevant knowledge on the state of civil society at a country level and 2) provide an assessment of civil society's current state by civil society stakeholders.

In each country the CSI-SAT is implemented by a National Coordinating Organisation (NCO), guided by a Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG) and the CSI project team at CIVICUS. The NCO, in the case of Georgia, was the Centre for Training and Consultancy. The NCO collects and synthesizes data and information on civil society from a variety of secondary sources. This information is employed by the SAG to score the 68 CSI indicators, which together provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of civil society. The findings are then finalized and a final report is published to publicise the CSI-SAT at national level. The international CSI project team at CIVICUS provides training, technical assistance and quality control to the NCO throughout the project implementation.

The CSI is an international comparative project currently involving more than 50 countries from around the world. It was conceived with two specific objectives: (1) providing useful knowledge on civil society and (2) increasing the commitment of stakeholders to strengthen civil society. The first objective inherits a certain tension between the country-specific knowledge and comparative cross-national knowledge available on a global scale. CIVICUS sought to resolve this tension by making it possible to adapt the methodology and the set of the indicators to country-specific factors, although in general the CTC kept to the overall project framework.

For the CTC, the project's main benefit has been the acquisition of useful data on Georgian civil society and the application of the CSI methodology and approach in the Georgian context. In the application of the CSI in Georgia both a challenge and an opportunity was seen, since the CSI offers a broad and inclusive definition of civil society and introduces issues, which CTC regarded as new and stimulating.

Structure of the Report

Section I, *The CSI-SAT Project: Background & Approach*, provides a detailed history of the CSI-SAT, its conceptual framework and research methodology.¹

Section II, *Civil Society in Georgia*, provides a background on civil society in Georgia and highlights some specific features of Georgian civil society. It also describes the use of the civil society concept in Georgia, as well as the definition employed by the CSI-SAT project.

¹ See also Appendix 1 The Scoring Matrix

Lastly, it describes the exercise of developing a map of civil society, which was carried out as part of the CSI-SAT implementation in Georgia.

Section III, entitled *Analysis of Civil Society*, is divided into four parts – Structure, Environment, Values and Impact – which correspond to the four main dimensions of the CSI. The presentation of the results according to individual dimensions and subdimensions is intended to be a resource repository, and readers looking for an overall interpretation of the report should refer to the conclusion.

The conclusion in Section IV maps the Civil Society Diamond and offers an interpretation of the implications of the report for the overall state of Georgian civil society.²

² The Civil Society Diamond is a visual tool developed by CIVICUS and Helmut Anheier, Director of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of California, Los Angeles, which presents the overall findings of the CSI study in form of a Diamond-shaped graph.

I CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX SHORTENED ASSESSMENT TOOL BACKGROUND AND APPROACH

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

The idea of a Civil Society Index originated in 1997, when the international non-governmental organisation CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation published the *New Civic Atlas* containing profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (CIVICUS 1997). To improve the comparability and quality of the information contained in the *New Civic Atlas*, CIVICUS decided to embark on the development of a comprehensive assessment tool for civil society, the Civil Society Index (Heinrich/Naidoo 2001; Holloway 2001). In 1999, Helmut Anheier, the director of the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics, played a significant role in the creation of the CSI concept (Anheier 2004). The concept was tested in fourteen countries during a pilot phase lasting from 2000 to 2002. Upon completion of the pilot phase, the project approach was thoroughly evaluated and refined. In its current implementation phase (2003-2005), CIVICUS and its country partners are implementing the project in more than fifty countries (see table I.1.1).

Table I.1.1: Countries participating in the CSI implementation phase 2003-20053

1. Argentina	19. Germany	38. Palestine
2. Armenia	20. Ghana	39. Poland
3. Azerbaijan	21. Greece*	40. Romania
4. Bolivia	22. Guatemala	41. Russia*
5. Bulgaria	23. Honduras	42. Scotland
6. Burkina Faso	24. Hong Kong (VR China)	43. Serbia
7. Chile*	25. Indonesia	44. Sierra Leone
8. China	26. Italy	45. Slovenia
9. Costa Rica	27. Jamaica	46. South Korea
10. Croatia	28. Lebanon	47. Taiwan*
11. Cyprus ⁴	29. Macedonia	48. Togo*
12. Czech Republic	30. Mauritius	49. Turkey
13. East Timor	31. Mongolia	50. Uganda
14. Ecuador	32. Montenegro*	51. Ukraine
15. Egypt	33. Nepal	52. Uruguay
16. Fiji	34. Netherlands	53. Vietnam*
17. Gambia	35. Nigeria	54. Wales*
18. Georgia*	36. Northern Ireland	
	37. Orissa (India)	

* Represents the seven countries implementing the CSI-SAT.

In Georgia, the project was implemented from March to November 2005 by the Centre for Training and Consultancy (CTC). CTC applied to conduct the project due to the CSI's aim to combine a comprehensive assessment on the state of civil society with the identification of concrete recommendations and actions on part of civil society stakeholders. Also, the comparison of civil society's features in Georgia with those of other post-Soviet countries were seen as potentially useful for CTC work to promote the sustainability of civil society in Georgia.

³ This list encompasses independent countries as well as other territories in which the CSI has been conducted, as of May 2006.

⁴ The CSI assessment was carried out in parallel in the northern and southern parts of Cyprus due to the de facto division of the island. However, the CSI findings were published in a single report as a symbolic gesture for a unified Cyprus.

2. PROJECT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The CSI-SAT uses a comprehensive project implementation approach and a structured framework to collect data on the state of civil society on the national level. At the core of the CSI lies a broad and encompassing definition of civil society, which informs the overall project implementation process. To assess the state of civil society in a given country, the CSI examines four key dimensions of civil society, namely its structure, external environment, values and impact on society at large. Each of these four dimensions is composed of a set of subdimensions, which again are made up of a set of individual indicators. These indicators form the basis for the CSI-SAT data collection process. The indicators also inform the assessment exercise undertaken by a Stakeholder Assessment Group (SAG). The CSI-SAT project approach, conceptual framework and research and assessment methodology are described in detail in the remainder of this section.⁵

2.1 Conceptual Framework

How to define civil society?

At the heart of the CSI's conceptual framework is obviously the concept of civil society. CIVICUS defines civil society as the space between the family, state and the market, where people come together to pursue their interests (CIVICUS 2003). In this respect and different from most other civil society concepts, the CSI-SAT has two interesting features. Firstly, it aims to go beyond the usual focus on formal and institutionalised CSOs, and to take account of informal coalitions and groups. Secondly, while civil society is sometimes perceived as a sphere in which positive activities and values reign, CIVICUS seeks to also include negative manifestations of civil society in its assessment. The concept therefore covers not only charitable associations or environmental organisations but also groups such as skinheads and aggressive sports fans. The CSI-SAT assesses not only the extent to which CSOs support democracy and tolerance, but also the extent to which they themselves are intolerant or even violent.

How to conceptualise the state of civil society?

To assess the state of civil society, the CSI-SAT examines civil society along four main dimensions:

- The **structure** of civil society (e.g. number of members, extent of giving and volunteering, number and features of umbrella organisations and civil society infrastructure, human and financial resources);
- The external **environment** in which civil society exists and functions (e.g. legislative, political, cultural and economic context, relationship between civil society and the state as well as the private sector);
- The **values** practiced and promoted within the civil society arena (e.g. democracy, tolerance or protection of the environment) and
- The **impact** of activities pursued by civil society actors (e.g. public policy impact, empowerment of people, meeting societal needs).


Each of these main dimensions is divided into a set of subdimensions which contain a total of 68 indicators.⁶ These indicators are at the heart of the CSI and they form the basis of the data presented in this report. The indicator – subdimension – dimension framework underpinned the entire process of data collection, the writing of the research report, the SAG's assessment of

⁵ For a detailed description of the CSI approach, see Heinrich (2004).

⁶ See Appendix 1.

Georgia's civil society and the presentations at the National Scoring Seminar (NSS). It is also used to structure the main part of this publication.

FIGURE I.1.1: Civil society diamond tool



To visually present the scores of the four main dimensions, the CSI-SAT makes use of the Civil Society Diamond tool⁷ (see figure I.1.1 for an example). The Civil Society diamond graph, with its four extremities, visually summarises the strengths and weaknesses of civil society.

The diagram is the result of the individual indicator scores aggregated into subdimension and then dimension scores. As it captures the essence of the state of civil society across its key dimensions, the Civil Society Diamond can provide a useful starting point for interpretations and discussions about how civil society looks like in a given country. As the Diamond does not aggregate the dimension scores into a single score, it cannot and should not be used to rank countries according to their scores on the four dimensions. Such an approach was deemed inappropriate for a civil society assessment, with so many multi-faceted dimensions, contributing factors and actors. The Diamond also depicts civil society at a certain point in time and therefore lacks a dynamic perspective. However, if applied iteratively, it can be used to chart the development of civil society over time as well as compare the state of civil societies across countries.

2.2 Project Methodology

This section described the methods used to collect and aggregate the various data used by the CSI project.

2.2.1 Data Collection. There has been a proliferation in the amount of literature published on civil society in recent years; however, there is a lack of an analytical framework that helps to organise and systematize this information into a comprehensive picture on the state of civil society at country level.

The CSI-SAT seeks to provide such a framework as it identifies and reviews relevant data sources that cover the full range of civil society organisations included in the CSI-SAT study.

⁷ The Civil Society Diamond was developed for CIVICUS by Helmut Anheier (see Anheier 2004).

Here a variety of national and international data sources are utilized and drawn together in accordance with the indicators' definitions provided by CIVICUS.

For the CSI-SAT study in Georgia, a comprehensive study of secondary sources took place. The project team began with a review of information from the many existing studies and research projects on civil society and various related subjects. It also examined the grey literature and donor studies on civil society.

2.2.2 Data Aggregation. The various data sources have been collated and synthesized by the CSI-SAT project team in a first draft country report, which is structured along the CSI indicators, subdimension and dimensions. This report presents the basis for the indicator scoring exercise carried out by the SAG. In this exercise, each score is rated on a scale of 0 to 3, with 0 being the lowest assessment possible and 3 the most positive. The scoring of each indicator is based on a short description of the indicator and a mostly qualitatively defined scale of scores from 0 to 3.⁸ This SAG scoring exercise is modelled along a “citizen jury” approach (Jefferson Centre 2002), in which citizens come together to deliberate, and make decision on a public issue, based on presented facts. The SAG’s role is to give a score (similar to passing a judgement) on each indicator based on the evidence (or data) presented by the National Index Team in form of the draft country report.

In Georgia, the scoring process was conducted as follows: First, the members of the SAG scored each indicator individually. Then, an average of these scores was calculated for each indicator, from which the scores for the subdimensions and dimensions were calculated through averaging. For approximately a quarter of the 68 indicators, it was straightforward to determine the final score and it did not require a judgment by the SAG, as these indicators were quantitatively defined and therefore did not leave any room for interpretation (e.g. indicators 1.1.1 and 2.4.1). There were about 30 indicators, for which the scores of SAG members differed considerably, meaning by more than one point. The SAG debated these controversial indicators at a day-long meeting and a new vote was taken for each of these indicators. A vote was also taken on the subdimensions and dimensions in case the average of the individual indicators and the result of an instant assessment of the whole subdimension or dimension by the SAG differed considerably. The final scores of the four dimensions (structure, environment, values and impact) were plotted to generate the Civil Society Diamond for Georgia. Then, the SAG spent time discussing and interpreting the shape of the Civil Society Diamond as well as possible causal relations between the scores for the four dimensions.⁹

2.3 Linking Research with Action

The CSI-SAT is not a strictly academic research project as its declared objective is to include civil society stakeholders in the research and assessment process.

Firstly, from the very start, a diverse group of consultants and advisors guided the project implementation in the form of the SAG. The group comprised representatives of CSOs, government authorities, and specialists in civil society research. At the beginning of the project, the SAG had the opportunity to amend the definition of civil society used for the purpose of the project and to provide input on the planned methodology. In the end, the SAG together with the NIT developed an assessment of the state of civil society in Georgia, based on the indicator scoring and the resulting Civil Society Diamond.

⁸ See Appendix 1

⁹ See Section VII

Overall, the project team made every attempt to conduct the process in as participatory manner as possible and consult broad range of stakeholders.

2.4 Project Outputs

The CSI implementation in Georgia yielded the following products and outputs:

- A comprehensive country report on the state of civil society, which represents a body of knowledge on the state of civil society at country level and its comparative profile on the global map of other nations civil societies;
- A shared understanding of the state of civil society among key stakeholders;
- Improved self-understanding of civil society and better appreciation of its roles and
- An assessment of civil society's strengths and weaknesses as well as priority areas for policy and action.

II CIVIL SOCIETY IN GEORGIA

1. HISTORY OF GEORGIA'S CIVIL SOCIETY¹⁰

The historical development of Georgia's civil society took place in several distinct phases, which are described below.

The Pre-Soviet Period: Interrupted Development

The development of a modern-style civil society in Georgia can be traced back to the middle of the 19th century. Some authors find rudimentary forms of civil society in the artisans' and merchants' guilds that existed in Tbilisi since the medieval period, and which facilitated a relatively high level of public participation in the 19th century. If the development of civil society in Georgia were based on the tradition of such institutions, it would be possible to argue that it was close in type to the classical Western European model of civil society. However, the leading role in civil society was not played by groups (or guilds) united by economic interests but by groups of people, such as the "intelligentsia" or "intellectuals", who had "progressive" liberal ideas.

It was the activities of the young Georgians who returned to Georgia, having been educated at Russian universities that gave a major boost to liberal ideas and to the emergence of a rudimentary civil society in Georgia. Ilia Chavchavadze was the most outstanding figure in this group of young intellectuals. At this same time the print media emerged in Georgia as a forum for discussing vitally important public issues. The first CSOs also appeared, with the Society Promoting Georgian Literacy being the most noteworthy of them. These civil associations were mainly cultural and educational in their activities and goals, but since the end of the 19th century political organisations began to develop as well.

The short period of the independent Georgian Republic, which existed between 1918 and 1921, marks the final stage of this period of early civil society development. Although this state existed for less than three years and was mainly preoccupied with the struggle for survival, political life was based on democratic principles, which would have been impossible without a certain degree of civil society development.

The communist system was established following the invasion of Georgia by Soviet Russia and soon developed into a totalitarian political regime, which denied people the chance to develop or participate in any private initiative in the public arena. During this period, so-called civil ("public") organisations existed that constituted imitations of civil organisations in democratic countries (e.g. trade unions, the *Komsomol*, the peace committee, creative artists' associations), but these organisations were neither voluntary nor independent from the state. However, some (non-political) forms of voluntary civic activities existed on an informal level, such as neighbourhood communities, self-help groups and philatelists' networks. During the final period of the Soviet regime, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the ensuing slow moderation of the regime's repressive policies allowed for the emergence of a dissident movement. The dissident movement in Eastern Europe considered itself a form of "civil society" and actively promoted this very notion. In Georgia, however, the dissident movement never became strong. Small groups that did emerge were mainly inspired by the idea of national independence, attaching less importance to liberal ideas. At the same time, within the permitted quasi-civil institutions, particularly among the artistic intelligentsia, mild and disguised deviations from the official ideology were more or less accepted.

¹⁰ The entire chapter draws on the work of Ghia Nodia (Nodia, G., 2005).

Against the State: the National Liberation Movement

The rebirth of civil society in Georgia was linked to the liberalization of the Soviet Communist regime in the late 1980s, brought about by the perestroika and glasnost policies of Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader. The first results of these policies in Georgia were the establishment of independent political groups and the gradual decrease of state control over the media. The new public discourse introduced by these new actors drew on nationalist and anti-communist ideas. Its goal was to establish an independent Georgian state based on western values and norms. Other groups were also established whose agenda was not *prima facie* political, but whose activities had apparent political implications. The two broadest and most successful public protest campaigns organized in this period were targeted against the construction of the Trans-Caucasus railway and Khudoni power station. Both were formally motivated by environmental concerns. The third important public protest campaign opposed the Soviet army's shooting practice range near the historical David Gareji monastery, which caused damage to the monastery. Despite environmental or conservationist concerns, in all these cases, mobilizing mass opposition against the Soviet Communist regime constituted the core motivation behind these public campaigns.

CSOs established in this period can be characterised by several features. The following are examples of these features. There was no demarcation line between political parties and non-political organisations. In terms of values, the guiding value was nationalism and anti-communism. The agenda of liberal civil society was prioritized only by a handful of organisations, though almost everybody gave it some lip service. Newly emerging associations were under-developed organisationally and depended on small groups of volunteers and, sometimes, sporadically, received contributions from the embryonic entities of private or semi-private business. This gave these associations an air of "authenticity" and romanticism, but also made them very unstable.

Private armed groups emerged as an important form, and negative manifestation, of civil activity. *Mkhedrioni* became the most well-known specimen of such organisations, which started as a patriotic movement, but quickly became criminalized when extortion at gunpoint became its main method of "fundraising".

Civil Society as NGOs: a New Paradigm

Since Georgia gained independence in 1992, European and American countries started taking an interest in promoting civil society in Georgia. Thus, various citizen groups in Georgia gained access to new resources for their initiatives, which drastically changed the environment for civil activity in Georgia. The main forms of civic initiatives were NGOs, which mainly depended on financial aid from western foundations. This can be described as the "NGO-sation of civil society". Within only a few years, from 1992-1995, the number of NGOs in Georgia reached several thousand. At this stage, foundations such as Open Society-Georgia, Eurasia Foundation and ISAR-Georgia (later known as the Horizonti Foundation) played particularly important roles in the development of the nongovernmental sector.

This new type of civil society had a number of specific traits. A clear demarcation emerged between political parties and NGOs. In terms of value orientation, the promotion of western-type liberal principles took clear priority. The types of NGO activities diversified with time. NGOs were involved in advocating for democracy and human rights, peace and conflict resolution, civic education and environmental protection. The professional level, as well as organisational sustainability of CSOs also advanced. However, some organisations existed

only nominally on paper or were set up to implement a project or two and ceased functioning thereafter. Dozens of others, owing to the prudent use of western financial aid, managed to develop a core permanent staff and sustainable, modern management systems. Cooperation and synergy mechanisms between NGOs also developed as they learned to unite their efforts to achieve specific goals and created a common understanding of how to jointly making up the Third Sector. More developed CSOs gained a certain level of public and political influence. The public learned about the Third Sector and identified it with the protection of certain values.

At the same time, the “NGO-sation” of civil society had its drawbacks. The Third Sector became clearly dependent on western aid, which turned its financial sustainability into a long-term and still unresolved structural problem. This dependence also caused problems for the sector’s legitimacy. Certain parts of society, particularly those which, based on political or ideological motives, were apprehensive of the influence of western values on Georgia, criticised the NGO community for promoting interests and values that are foreign to Georgia and accused them of being unprincipled in their use and waste of western money (“grant-guzzlers”). The latter accusation was not completely unfounded, since against the background of a general lack of economic development, western grants provided an opportunity for relatively high income for NGO staff. Thus, it was only natural that some organisations transformed civil activism into a sort of business. At the same time, Georgian NGOs had little opportunity to influence the general directions of western foundations and, therefore, they often had to change their activities to be in line with a change in founders’ priorities.

Thus, the creation of sources of western financial aid gave a significant boost to CSOs’ sustainability and by doing so, also promoted their public influence. At the same time it raised public concerns about NGOs’ “authenticity”, including their lack of being “rooted” in their own society and questions about a genuine devotion to their declared values. The real issue here is not that the civil society sector is staffed with unprincipled opportunists, but rather, under the specific circumstances it is difficult to make a convincing case against such accusations.

CSOs and the “Rose Revolution”

The Rose Revolution, as well as the periods preceding it and following it, highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Georgia. Since 2000 the government’s popularity began to fall drastically, which coincided with an internal rift : a younger and more reformist wing of the government, represented by leaders such as Zurab Zhvania, Mikheil Saakashvili and, partly, the New Conservatives, distanced themselves from the leaders and particularly from President Shevardnadze and became the leading force of the opposition.

This led to important changes in the relationship between CSOs on the one hand and the government and political parties on the other. Prior to this period, the Third Sector tried to distance itself from the political struggle. But under the new circumstances, in which the Shevardnadze government increasingly tilted to authoritarianism, whereas the leading opposition parties declared an orientation towards western democratic values, some activist organisations, of which the Liberty Institute was the most well-known, chose a policy of explicit opposition to the government. Formally this did not imply support for any individual opposition party, but as a matter of fact most of the Third Sector appeared to be an ally of the pro-western opposition, especially that of Mikheil Saakashvili and the National Movement. Facilitated by the Open Society-Georgia Foundation, these civil society actors set up a coordination council, whose main goal was to mobilise public resources to secure fair

elections and to oppose the government's undemocratic behaviour. The establishment of the *Kmara* youth organisation, specialized in organizing peaceful rallies against the government, proved to be particularly significant.

Some other organisations, namely, Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, deemed the politicization of the Third Sector unacceptable and called for NGOs to play the role of neutral arbiters. They believed that politicization would turn NGOs into puppets of political parties. However, the proponents of this idea found themselves in a minority.

In November 2004, a peaceful, albeit unconstitutional, change in government took place in Georgia. Mass protests of citizens continued for about three weeks, resulting in President Eduard Shevardnadze's resignation on 23 November 2004. The protests were triggered by massive fraud during the 2 November parliamentary elections. According to a widely shared view, the results of the elections were rigged for the benefit of the ruling parties, the Citizens' Union and Revival. Such an assessment was confirmed by the differences between the preliminary results of the election and exit polls, as well as the parallel vote tabulation. This episode of government change went down in history by the name of the Rose Revolution. The vast majority of Georgia's population and the international community deemed the Rose Revolution a significant landmark, demonstrating Georgia's embrace of democratic values.

The decisive role in the Rose Revolution was played by the new political opposition, first of all by Mikheil Saakashvili and his National Movement, as well as by the New Democrats, led by Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania, and some other political groups. The independent media, particularly Rustavi-2, played a very important role. Also, according to a commonly accepted view, CSOs significantly contributed to the success of the Rose Revolution, though there may be different assessments of the extent of their contribution. The role of civil society in the Rose Revolution can be seen in a number of issues:

- Civil society, to a great extent, contributed to the de-legitimization of the Shevardnadze regime and to the definition of the agenda for democratic reforms. CSOs became a point of concentration of important intellectual resources; therefore their renowned and popular representatives were able to exert significant influence on public opinion. The cooperation of civil society institutions with the media was especially significant, as the media often invited representatives of the Third Sector in order to elicit independent expert opinion. A group of the most active CSOs regularly criticised inappropriate and illegal actions by the government and promoted the idea that democratic reforms were needed. To sum up, CSOs had a significant influence on the discourse that underpinned the Rose Revolution.
- CSOs contributed to the organised and peaceful nature of the protests. Thanks to ten years of work by CSOs, certain forms of civil activism developed that were conducive to the promotion of democratic values and institutions. A Georgia-wide network of democratic activists was established, which shortly before and during the Rose Revolution, was transformed into a significant pool of human and institutional resources for public protests. Not only did its presence foster the mobilization of protests, it also helped to make them sustainable, organised, controlled and peaceful.
- Although the opinion that Georgia's elections were characterised by mass fraud had also been voiced before, it was only during the 2003 elections that convincing evidence was obtained showing that the immense scale of vote rigging cast doubt on the legitimacy of the whole electoral process. It is first and foremost the nongovernmental sector that deserves

credit for this outcome. The above mentioned council of CSOs ensured the inclusion of reputable international agencies in the organisation of exit polls, which increased the credibility of the poll's results. The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) conducted parallel vote tabulation, thereby collecting particularly strong evidence of election rigging.

After the Revolution: New Tasks and Challenges

The Rose Revolution resulted in the public associating a certain section of civil society with the new government. To some extent this was also the perception of the donor community and was strengthened by the fact that CSOs became one of the important pools of human resources used by the new government.

These new developments provided a formidable challenge for the Third Sector. How should CSOs build their relationship with the new government, and with the wider public, if the public perceives no difference between the principles of the government and CSOs, in terms of their values? Can civil society fulfil the function of an objective commentator on public developments, if the government is composed of their friends (often personal friends)?

In the post-revolutionary period civil society's importance, at least in the perception of the public, declined. The government believed that it had already absorbed a large part of the best human resources available in the Third Sector. Thus, listening to the remaining CSO activists was seen as less important, especially as the government did not lack public support. Within the donor community the opinion prevailed that the funding flows should be diverted to the new government, since this would be the shortest and most effective way of achieving the country's goal of democratic development. The media paid less attention to CSO-organised events, as it no longer considered this community an important actor in public life.

Those organisations that had not supported the revolution, for their part, expressed fear that they would be marginalized by the bulk of civil society that supported the revolution, or even become the target of repression by the government.

However, some positive expectations existed regarding the future role of civil society. For some, the absence of any essential differences between the values professed by the government and the CSOs should have led to a more productive and cooperative relationship between the two sectors. In this regard, CSOs would not play the role of an opposition to government or of pressure groups; rather they would focus on implementing specific projects for the public good.

From today's perspective, a general assessment can be made that the changes in the status and activities of CSOs have proved to be less profound than expected in the months immediately following the revolution. In the first place it should be noted that, in contrast to many expectations, the new Georgian government prioritized the strengthening of state institutions in general rather than the advancement of democratic institutions and protection of human rights. The very first important decision by the government, the constitutional changes passed in February 2004, was strongly criticised by civil society actors because these changes significantly weakened the parliament and gave a more authoritarian, super-presidentialist nature to Georgia's political system. Personal contacts with the new government did not help the most active segment of civil society to convince the former that such constitutional changes would be undemocratic. Moreover, the adoption of the changes was not preceded by a proper public discussion.

The new government's practices attracted criticism by the Third Sector's in many other respects too. This concerned the violations of human rights and legal norms in the process of the campaign led against organised crime and corruption, the pressure on the judiciary and the independent media by the new leaders and the government's intolerant rhetoric against its opponents.

Therefore, since autumn 2004, the relationship between the government and CSOs returned to its previous mode, whereby cooperation and opposition take turns. The migration of personnel from CSOs to the government has not caused a serious decrease in the organisational potential of CSOs. The focus of attention returned to the issues on which the civil society used to dwell before the revolution: identifying priorities for action, developing organisational capacity, seeking sustainable resources, and expanding the social base and public participation.

2. THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY USED IN THIS STUDY

As mentioned in Section I.2.1 above, the civil society definition proposed by CIVICUS is characterised by a very broad scope, encompassing 'positive' and 'negative' organisations, and also informal forms of citizen participation. Applying this civil society concept to the Georgian context led to considerable discussions. The Georgian project team regarded this broad definition as a challenging standard, which, unfortunately, was not always possible to adhere to since no sufficient data was available on more informal forms of civil participation. For the most of the research, the team focused on organisations, especially on 'positive ones'. The informality of civil society and its negative aspects only entered into the CSI assessment at certain points, such as informal and negative groups in indicators 3.3.1 or 3.3.2.

Apart from tackling the issue of the definition of the breadth of civil society, the project team, together with the SAG, had to make decisions regarding a number of organisation types. Their inclusion into the civil society concept is unresolved in the literature and strongly depends on country-specific historical factors.

CIVICUS drafted a list of 19 types of CSOs in order to make the civil society definition operational. The task of the SAG was to adapt the list to the Georgian environment. The team agreed on one substantial amendment – all the media, not only the proposed non-for-profit media, was included in the list of CSOs. The resulting list of types of organisations is provided in table II.2.1.

Table II.2.1: Types of CSOs included in the study


1. Faith-based organisations	9. Professional and business associations (e.g. chambers of commerce, professional associations)
2. Trade unions	10. Community-level groups/associations (e.g. burial societies, self-help groups, parents' associations)
3. Advocacy CSOs (e.g. civic action, social justice, peace, human rights, consumers' groups)	11. Economic interest CSOs (e.g. co-operatives, credit unions, mutual saving associations)
4. Service CSOs (e.g. CSOs supporting community development, literacy, health, social services)	12. Ethnic/traditional/indigenous associations/organisations
5. CSOs active in education, training & research (e.g. think tanks, resource centres, nonprofit schools, public education organisations)	13. Environmental CSOs
6. Media	14. Culture & arts CSOs.
7. Associations established by various social groups: Women, Student, and youth associations	15. Social and recreational CSOs & sport clubs
8. Associations of socio-economically marginalised groups (e.g. poor people, homeless, landless, immigrants, refugees)	16. Charitable organisations (Grant-making foundations etc) & fund-raising bodies
	17. Political parties and organisations
	18. CSO networks/federations/support organisations
	19. Social movements (e.g. those of earthquake victims, peace movement)

3. MAPPING CIVIL SOCIETY IN GEORGIA

How does civil society look in Georgia? How does it relate to broader social forces in the country? To explore these issues further, the SAG conducted a social forces and civil society mapping exercise. Drawing on participatory rural appraisal methods, these mapping exercises seek to visually present the major forces within civil society and broad society, and to examine the relations between these forces (see figures II.3.1 and II.3.2)


Four different sizes of the boxes introduce the four categories of the forces according to their influence: Most influential, Influential, Somewhat influential and Least Influential. The larger the box, the more power this actor is believed to wield. The different colours denote the societal sectors to which the respective actor belongs: red denotes state, blue stands for business, yellow for civil society and green for other actors.

The social forces map for Georgia shows the dominance of state actors. The most influential force among them is the President and the other actors are grouped around him. Civil society is small, but still fairly influential. Most actors are located in close proximity and only some of them are marginalized, such as internally displaced people. Western governments and Russia have a strong influence. The church, being one of the influential actors, is not linked to any of the other actors.

FIGURE II.3.1: Social Forces Map

To explore the main actors in civil society sector and their relations more deeply, a civil society map was produced by the SAG, employing the same approach as the social forces map. The map (see figure II.2.3) shows that the most influential civil society actor is the media, namely television. The SAG included all types of media in the list of CSOs since the media lacks commercial sustainability and is dependent on various interest groups, which leads to the majority of influential television channels and printed media outlets being subsidiaries of businessmen closely linked to the political elite. It is therefore widely accepted that the government can strongly influence society through the electronic media that are owned by political allies and friends.

The core group of civil society actors are somewhat distanced from the media and are represented by influential professional associations, think tanks, advocacy NGOs, and service NGOs. The political opposition parties are somewhat influential though stand apart from the core group of CSOs. The least influential group of CSOs, which does not interact much with other organisations, are faith based organisations (FBOs) linked to the Orthodox Church, community based organisations (CBOs) and organisations representing the poorest part of population, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs)

FIGURE II.3.2: Civil Society Map

In reflecting on the mapping exercises, SAG members felt that the resulting maps represent a fairly adequate picture of the existing power relations between different social and civil society players in Georgia.

Some of these issues will re-emerge in the main section of this report, which examines the current state of Georgia's civil society.

III ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY


This section presents the bulk of the information and data collected during the course of the project. The analysis is structured along the individual indicators, subdimensions and dimensions.

The section is divided along the four dimensions: **Structure, Environment, Values and Impact**, which make up the CSI Diamond. At the beginning of each part, a graph provides the scores for the subdimensions on a scale from 0 to 3 with 0 being the lowest assessment possible and 3 the most positive. Findings for each subdimension are then examined in detail. A separate box also provides the scores for the individual indicators for each subdimension.¹¹

1. STRUCTURE

This section describes and analyses the overall size, strength and vibrancy of civil society in human, organisational, and economic terms. The score for the Structure dimension is **1.4**, indicating that the structure of Georgian civil society is somewhat weak. The graph below shows the scores for the five subdimensions within the structure dimension: breadth of citizen participation, diversity of civil society participants, level of organisation, inter-relations and civil society resources. The subdimension, ‘depth of citizen participation’, was taken out of the analysis, since there was no reliable secondary data available.

FIGURE III.1.1: Subdimension scores in structure dimension



1. 1. Breadth of citizen participation

This subdimension looks at the extent of various forms of citizen participation in Georgia’s civil society. The indicator ‘collective community action’ (1.1.5) has been taken out, according to CIVICUS suggestions, since there is no relevant secondary data.

¹¹ For a more detailed description of the indicator scores, it is recommended to refer to Appendix 1–The CSI Scoring Matrix.


Table III.1.1: Indicators assessing the extent of citizen participation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.1.1	Non-partisan political action	<u>2</u>
1.1.2	Charitable giving	<u>0</u>
1.1.3	CSO membership	<u>0</u>
1.1.4	Volunteer work	<u>0</u>

1.1.1. Non-partisan political action. Citizens attach considerable importance to public participation. According to a 2003 survey, the majority of respondents in the capital (72.3 percent) were sure that solving the problems currently facing Georgia will only be possible through public participation (Sumbadze, N., 2003).

However, not all forms of public participation are practised widely. Taking part in rallies is the most popular form of expressing one's civic position. Strikes, usually spontaneous ones, are another important form of public protest. Two historic examples of this form of civic expression took place in October 2001 and November 2003. On October 2001, an action of the prosecutors' office against Rustavi 2, the most popular independent television company, triggered a large-scale protest rally, which led to the government being dismissed by the president and the speaker of the Parliament resigning. In November 2003, mass protests against fraud in Parliamentary elections led to mass protests ending in the resignation of the president. The event is now known as the "Rose Revolution".

Figure III.1.2 shows that people give preference to forms of participation such as participating in a protest rally, over more conventional forms, such as attending a meeting, or contacting local authorities. Presumably, based on their experience, such as the success of the Rose Revolution, people consider this form of influencing events to be both legitimate and effective. Figure III.1.3 shows that attendance in rallies considerably increased after the Rose Revolution.

FIGURE III.1.2: The most acceptable form of participation to influence the government

*Source Sumbadze, N. and Tarkhan-Mouravi, G., 2003

1.1.2 Charitable giving. The tradition of charitable giving is not very developed in Georgia. There is no quantitative information on the proportion of citizens who regularly donate to charity.

Charitable giving is mainly initiated by charity organisations that most often receive funds from foreign donors. Such organisations carry out activities to provide free medical aid, ensure education for poor children and provide shelter for street children. Some wealthy

Georgian businessmen have also established fairly visible charitable foundations, such as the Badri Patarkatsishvili fund. Street children and orphans and other socially vulnerable groups represent main target groups for charity-giving supported by foreign as well as domestic donors.

Until recently, when asked about lack of institutionalized charitable-giving, business representatives attributed this to not having a law defining tax incentives for charitable donations¹² (CSR DG and UNAG, 2005). However, the new tax code adopted in January 2005 created such incentives. It remains to be seen to what extent it will encourage corporate giving.

1.1.3 CSO membership. While there is no exact information on what percentage of citizens are members of CSOs, surveys of NGOs provide some data on this issue. “According to the research study conducted in 2002... only 5.8 percent of respondents have had any type of involvement with CSOs” (Nodia, G., 2005, p.31). Around 9000 NGOs are currently registered in Georgia, but around 90 percent are believed not to be active.


Few Georgian NGOs are membership or constituency-based organisations. As a rule, the number of members is limited by the founders of organisations in order to make the running of the organisation easier, which indirectly points to the lack of internal democracy within CSOs¹³. A research study, conducted in 2003 (CSR DG and UNAG, 2003) found that only 19 out of 184 organisations had more than one hundred members. Even in these cases, however, membership is often purely formal and does not imply active participation. Membership for the remaining 165 organisations did not exceed 30-50 people.

Taking into consideration the strong difference between active and passive membership, the SAG considered the percentage of people which belong to at least one CSO to be less than 30 percent.

1.1.4 Volunteering. According to the results of a survey carried out in 2002, 38.3 percent of respondents expressed readiness to be involved in activities organised by CSOs on a voluntary basis (Kachkachishvili, J., 2002).

Some CSOs attract volunteers, but volunteering often takes place with either the aim of future employment in the given organisation or in order to gain work experience. Organizations

FIGURE III.1.3: Participation in collective actions before and since Rose Revolution



¹² See indicator 2.5.4

¹³ See indicator 3.1.1 - *Democratic practices within CSOs*

outside of the capital are more likely to attract volunteers. According to the 2005 research findings, 25 percent of Tbilisi-based organisations do not have volunteers at all, while in other regions the same Figure amounts to only 14 percent (CSR DG and UNAG, 2005).

1.2. Depth of citizen participation ¹⁴

1.3. Diversity of civil society participants

This subdimension examines how diverse and representative the civil society arena is. It examines whether all social groups participate equitably in civil society activities, and whether there are any groups that are dominant or excluded. Table III.1.3 summarises the respective scores.

Table III.1.3: Indicators assessing diversity of civil society participants

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.3.1	Representation of social groups among CSO members	<u>2</u>
1.3.2	Representation of social groups among CSO leadership	<u>1</u>
1.3.3	Distribution of CSOs around the country	<u>2</u>

1.3.1 CSO membership. The assessment of social representation in civic organisations depends on whether a broad or narrow definition of CSOs is used. If CSOs are defined broadly, to encompass faith based organisations as well, a picture of a wider and diverse representation emerges. If CSOs are defined as organisations established after the collapse of communism and dependent on foreign financial assistance, the focus is on the ‘core CSOs’. “People involved in [this] sector are mostly of a particular social profile: they are relatively young, well-educated and reside in the capital. This gives the sector a certain elitist touch. Correspondingly, the ... sector has not become an arena for wide public participation in civil processes...” (Nodia, G., 2005, p. 31).

1.3.2 CSO leadership. No specific data on this issue is available. However, if it is assumed that representation of social groups among CSO leaders is similar to that among their members, less educated people and rural dwellers will also be considered as less represented in the CSO leadership.

Women are better represented in the leadership of CSOs as compared to politics or business. Out of 2713 NGOs studied in 2002, 808, or 29 percent, had female leaders (Gaprindashvili, L., 2003).

Representatives from ethnic minority groups only lead those CSOs whose with agendas are focused on ethnic issues. There are about 120 ethnic community organisations in Georgia (Stepanian, A., 2003).

As the SAG discussion revealed, low income groups are also less represented in the CSO leadership since lack of education and social connections do not allow them to raise funds for their organisations.

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs. CSOs are not equally distributed throughout Georgia. In 2005, 60 percent of the total number of 9000 foundations and associations registered in Georgia were based in the capital, where about one fourth of the population lives. The rest of the

¹⁴ This subdimension was taken out, since no reliable data on its indicators is available in Georgia.

organisations are mainly active in regional centres and comparatively large settlements. However, there are also community based organisations functioning in many villages (Georgian Ministry of Justice, 2005).

The distribution of registered organisations by region is shown in the chart below (Georgian Ministry of Justice, 2005).


Table III.1.4: Registered CSOs in Georgia

Regions	Number of CSOs
Tbilisi	4326
Samegrelo	739
Imereti	691
Ajara	450
Kakheti	364
Samtskhe-Javakheti	348
Shida Kartli	311
Other	1771

According to research conducted in 2005, activities of 73.9 percent of organisations went beyond the locality where they were based. This included 15.2 percent of organisations that were active throughout the whole country, while one fifth of them carried out projects only in some regions (CSR DG & UNAG, 2005).

FIGURE III.1.4: Geographical distribution of CSOs' activities

Based on this data, the SAG concluded that CSOs are present in all except the most remote areas of the country.



1.4. Level of organisation.

This subdimension refers to the infrastructure and internal organisation of Georgia's civil society. Table III.1.4 summarises the respective indicator scores

Table III.1.5: Indicators assessing level of organisation

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.4.1	Existence of umbrella bodies	0
1.4.2	Effectiveness of umbrella bodies	2
1.4.3	Self-regulation within civil society	2
1.4.4	Support infrastructure	2
1.4.5	International linkages	0

1.4.1. Existence of CSO umbrella bodies. There are no large umbrella-organisations uniting large numbers of CSOs active in different areas of activities. In the past, some individuals or organisations advocated for the establishment of such a cross-sectoral association as it would

better promote interests and values of the “third sector”. However, local groups were sceptical about such an initiative; some of them feared that such an umbrella body might increase the chance of the government influencing the sector, while others did not think creating such a large association would be worth the effort (Nodia, G., 2005).

On the other hand, there are federations and stable networks that unite a number of organisations within certain sectors, such as trade unions (e.g. Amalgamation of Trade Unions’ of Georgia), sport organisations (e.g. Georgia’s Football Federation), ethnic community organisations (e.g. Public Movement Multinational Georgia) and women organisations. Whereas there is no actual data on the share of CSOs belonging to federations, SAG estimated that the share of such organisations was well below 30 percent.

1.4.2 Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies. The existing CSO umbrella bodies differ with regards to their effectiveness. In the case of sports organisations, they are quite effective, since without these federations sports clubs could not function effectively since the federations provide important services and functions for individual members (e.g. championships, competitions etc).

As for the trade unions, most are united in the Amalgamation of Trade Unions of Georgia. However, this organisation is stigmatized as a continuation of the trade unions of the communist era¹⁵, ridden by internal conflicts and gradually losing its members. After the Rose Revolution, it is under attack from the government that pressured it to give up part of its property.

According to the SAG’s assessment, while umbrella organisations may be few, the existing ones perform quite effectively.

1.4.3 Self-regulation. Initial steps have been taken to establish mechanisms for CSO self-regulation. This primarily refers to the introduction of NGO Code of Ethics, which was viewed favourably by most of the NGO sector. The Code was adopted within the framework of the USAID-supported ‘Citizens Advocate! Program’, after broad consultations with different organisations regarding the content, tools and mechanisms for the implementation of the Code (NGOSI, 2003). It establishes minimal standards of behaviour for Georgian CSOs related to organisations’ relations with the government, political parties, donors and society in general, as well as their internal procedures, accountability and transparency. However, only a limited number of CSOs are involved in this initiative, and effective mechanisms of monitoring, assessment and enforcement are yet to be enacted. As a result, the impact of the initiative is rather limited.

1.4.4 Support infrastructure. Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and it is expanding. There are several fairly developed organisations that specialize in capacity-building for the civil sector, such as Centre for Training and Consultancy (focused on participatory methods of planning and quality management systems), Partners Georgia (focused on mediation and conflict management trainings) and Horizonti Foundation (which is focused on community mobilization issues). Some donors (such as Open Society Georgia Foundation and UNDP) set up programmes in order to facilitate CSOs access to information technologies (NGOSI, 2003).

¹⁵ Today, some people consider the former communist unions as ‘phony trade unions’ implying the compulsory character of their membership in the Soviet times.

However, the SAG assessment is that the capacity of this infrastructure is not sufficient to meet the demands of the sector.

1.4.5 International linkage. Some well-developed CSOs are members of international unions and networks. The most developed are networks that work in the South Caucasus and are oriented towards specific issues, such as problems facing women, forced migration and environmental issues (e.g. CENN, CRINGO Network and REC Caucasus).

Few organisations are involved in global international networks. For instance, the United Nations Association of Georgia is part of the World Federation of the United Nations Associations, Partners-Georgia is involved with the Partners for Democratic Changes network, the Centre for Training and Consultancy is part of the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPACEE) and the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development is part of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. In 2003 766 international NGOs had Georgian individuals and CSOs as members, while for Estonia (with 3 times lesser population) the same number was 1673. However, this indicator for Georgia is better than in neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the same numbers were 578 and 446 respectively (Anheier et al., 2004).

1.5. Inter-relations

This subdimension examines relations between civil society actors in Georgia. Table III.1.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.6: Indicators assessing inter-relations within civil society

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.5.1	Communication between CSOs	<u>2</u>
1.5.2	Cooperation between CSOs	<u>2</u>

1.5.1 Communication. Civil society actors have rather well-established channels and means of communication. Among other tools this includes the Internet journal *Advocacy.ge* and InfoCENN, a regional environmental information exchange. These electronic news services compensate partially for the otherwise insufficient information flows between organisations in the capital and the regions and make it easier for organisations around the country to adequately react to national events.

In the last few years civil society intensified its efforts to provide better information on its activities. In September and October 2004, within the framework of *Citizens Advocate!* Program, a cooperative programme aimed at civil society development by promoting communication between its actors as well as with broad society, TV-reels on the activities of 27 leading Georgian NGOs were broadcast, and in April 2005 the first Fair of CSOs was arranged, attracting significant public interest (CSR DG&UNAG, 2005). In 2005, CSOs, in the regions of Imereti, Samegrelo, Shida Kartli and Achara, also increased their cooperation with the media, particularly with electronic media. In stark contrast to media practice in the previous era, electronic media in Achara (Achara TV and Channel 25) often gives the floor to CSOs, including those established after the revolution (CSR DG&UNAG, 2005).

1.5.2 Cooperation. Civil society actors frequently cooperate with each other on issues of common concern, and 64.1 percent of organisations (covered by the CSR DG and UNAG research) had experience of jointly implementing projects. The organisations come together

both to implement single projects, as well as to establish long-term coalitions (CSR DG&UNAG, 2005). Such coalitions usually involve NGOs or, in some cases, NGOs and media organisations. Other cross-sectoral coalitions are rare but do exist as well: for instance, International Centre for Civic Culture, a Georgian NGO, acted in coalition with the Union of the Georgian Towns Self Governments being one of its founders.

Two new representative media associations were established in 2003: “Association of Broadcasters” and “Association of Newspapers Publishers”. Many regional media organisations cooperated with NGOs because of the parliamentary elections, and local self-governance bodies considered CSOs as natural allies. For instance, the self-governance body of the city of Tbilisi approached an NGO, the International Institute for Educational Policy, Planning and Management (IPPM), to develop a school financing model (NGOSI, 2003).

1.6. Resources

This subdimension examines the resources available for civil society organisations in Georgia. Table III.1.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.1.7: Indicators assessing civil society resources

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
1.6.1	Financial resources	1
1.6.2	Human resources	2
1.6.3	Technical and infrastructural resources	2

1.6.1 Financial resources. Due to international donor support, the financial resources of Georgian NGOs are relatively strong, compared to other sectors of Georgian society, and have tended to grow over time. However, financial resources are still insufficient for meeting their goals.

The main sources of financing for NGOs are grants received from donor organisations: 50 to 100 percent of annual budgets of about 80 percent of organisations are comprised of grants received from donor organisations. Only one-third of organisations have membership fees and in most of them respective revenue does not exceed 5 percent of their total income. There are only a few organisations, such as the Federation of Businessmen, or the Federation of Accountants, where membership fees makes up 15 to 50 percent of their budget (Nodia, G., 2005). Most NGOs see income generation and local resource mobilization as viable strategies only for CBOs and NGOs with very small budgets (NGOSI, 2003). During the last two years, only one-fifth of organisations received donations from businesses or individuals, although such donations were occasional and small. The percentage of organisations able to receive financing from the government is even lower – 13 percent. Many organisations are involved in income-generating activities, such as contractual services or publications.

There is a significant gap between the financial resources of organisations based in the capital and the rest. There are very few regional organisations that have an annual budget above 50 000 USD, while in Tbilisi many organisations command a much higher budgets (CSR DG & UNAG, 2005).

The continuity of financing represents an important dimension of any organisation’s viability. While more developed organisations have continuous financing for years, many, especially in the regions outside of the capital, frequently suffer interruptions of their funding flows (CSR DG & UNAG, 2005).

Since despite generous western donations most of Georgian civil society actors' revenues could not be considered as sustainable the SAG assessed the country's CSOs financial resources as somewhat inadequate.

1.6.2 Human resources. In general, CSOs have the human resources they require for achieving their defined goals. After the Rose Revolution, many members of the NGO community (including some popular leaders) moved into government or opposition parties, but there are different opinions whether this weakened the sector or not: Some organisations that lost their leaders, strengthened their ties with the Government and became more attractive for a new generation of skilled professionals.

The issue of attracting and maintaining human resources depends on CSOs' financial resources. According to CSRDG and UNAG research, in approximately half of organisations included in the research, the total number of employees during the last two years increased. Only 6 percent of NGOs did not manage to maintain their previous number of staff. The 189 CSOs interviewed in 2002, had approximately 1 000 paid permanent staff-members combined. This number was increased to 1,518 in 2005 (184 CSOs interviewed). During the last three years in Tbilisi there were not substantial changes in the number of temporary staff involved in programmes' implementation, while in regions the number of organisations, which were able to employ such temporary staff, increased (CSRDG&UNAG, 2005).

In the last few years, progress has also been made in building coalitions and networking capacities. This is in part a result of donors encouraging coalition building (NGOSI, 2003). Hence, the SAG considered that CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.


1.6.3 Technological and infrastructural resources. On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals. However, there is an obvious gap regarding the levels of technical equipment between the Tbilisi-based and regional organisations: the former are much better equipped, but during the last two years the technical equipment of regional organisations has substantially improved.

Most organisations rent their offices. In comparison with 2002, the portion of organisations possessing their own office increased, while the number of organisations using government donated office space decreased.

As can be seen in the graph below, all regions report a growing use of PCs. In Tbilisi, the number of computers per organisation even doubled over the last three years.

FIGURE III.1.5: Personal computers in Georgian CSOs

Internet access is a problem for many organisations, especially in the regions where there are no Internet providers, and 25 percent of organisations had no access to the Internet at all; but those that



which have improved the quality of their access to the Internet as a result of technical progress in Georgia. Organizations with the lowest level of internet connections are in the Guria, Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kakheti regions (CSR DG&UNAG, 2005).

Conclusion

The information presented above provides a mixed picture of civil society's structure in Georgia. On the one hand, it shows the existence of a rather large number of citizens who generally understand the value of civic participation and who are increasingly active in expressing their attitudes towards different social and political issues. The Rose Revolution of 2004 was the peak of such civic activism, and the period afterwards proved that this successful demonstration of "people's power" helped Georgian citizens to develop and maintain the taste for actively expressing their opinions on public matters. However, this participation is rather one-sided, as it is mainly expressed in more or less spontaneous forms of protest, such as participation in peaceful protest rallies. Broad public activism does not lead to the creation of large-scale interest, value or issue-based civic associations that would focus on promoting rather than resisting specific policies.

On the other hand there is a fairly well-developed network of civil society organisations that have accumulated human resources, expertise, organisational capacity and the experience of working in coalitions towards specific goals. Although, after the Rose Revolution, this network lost a portion of its leaders and the level of its public visibility has decreased, it has retained considerable power of agenda-setting and providing specific services. However, since these organisations continue to be mainly dependent on foreign financial aid they fail to develop strong ties in the broader society and also mainly represent more educated and westernized strata of society.


The limited extent of civic participation (with the mentioned exception of protest rallies) expresses itself in such indicators as the relative weakness of genuinely membership-based organisations such as political parties, trade unions or large issue-based civic associations. Only a small percentage of Georgians are members of a CSO. Charitable activities are weakly developed with the few organised charities being restricted to receiving donations from a handful of rich businessmen. It is also notable that the Orthodox Church, by far the strongest faith-based organisation in Georgia, is not active in civil society.

This obvious gap between the relatively organised "third sector" or the NGO community and the citizenry can be explained by different factors such as lack of experience of democratic government and civic participation (except for the last 15 years), the deficit of social trust in society that makes most people rely on small groups based on personal relations, or extensive economically-motivated emigration that involved the most active parts of the society. However, the last ten years also demonstrate an obvious trend of progress with regards to both the breadth and quality of civic participation. The extrapolation of this trend gives hope for the development of a more robust structure for civil society in Georgia. This would require the difficult transformation of civic energy expressed in public protest into more proactive, long-term and agenda-based civic initiatives.

2. ENVIRONMENT

This section describes and analyses the overall political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment in which civil society exists and functions. The score for the Environment Dimension is 1.4, indicating a somewhat disabling environment for civil society. Figure III.2.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Environment dimension. It shows that the low support from the corporate sector, low level of tolerance and persisting problems with regards to basic freedoms, and the political context do not contribute to the development of robust civil society in Georgia.

FIGURE III.2.1: Subdimension scores in environment dimension



2.1. Political context

This subdimension examines the political situation in Georgia and its impact on civil society. Table III.2.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.1: Indicators Assessing Political Context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.1.1	Political Rights	<u>1</u>
2.1.2	Political competition	<u>1</u>
2.1.3	Rule of law	<u>1</u>
2.1.4	Corruption	<u>0</u>
2.1.5	State effectiveness	<u>1</u>
2.1.6	Decentralisation	<u>1</u>

2.1.1 Political rights. Citizens can participate in the political processes through freely establishing political parties and by participating in elections as voters and candidates for public office. However, widespread violations in the electoral process and lack of even ground for political competition continue to undermine citizens' trust that they can elect their political leaders through free and fair elections.

Since independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, power has never been transferred democratically in Georgia. In January 1992, the first Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia (elected in May 1991) was overthrown by opposition forces in a military coup. Following the

November 2003 parliamentary elections, which were considered rigged by most Georgians as well as international observers, mass protest demonstrations forced then President, Eduard Shevardnadze, to resign.

After the Rose Revolution, presidential and parliamentary elections, in January and March 2004 respectively, were considered free and fair by domestic and international observers, but the level of political competition in them was rather low. The international organisation Freedom House (2005) slightly improved Georgia's score in 'political rights' from 4 to 3.¹⁶

Many observers consider the 7% threshold for the entry of political parties into Georgia's parliament too high. In January 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) passed a resolution, which "recommends lowering the 7% electoral threshold in order to create conditions for a pluralist and genuinely representative parliament" (Sepashvili, G., 2005).

Until 2005, the composition of electoral commissions in Georgia was based on representation of various political parties, though government representatives were always in a majority. Allegedly, parties used their participation in electoral commissions to strike deals on rigging the results. Following the amendments to the Electoral Code in 2005, electoral commissions are to be composed of non-partisan professionals. However, the opposition harshly criticised this concept, interpreting it as an introduction of a "mono-partisan electoral commissions" (Online Magazine-Civil Georgia, 2005).

Currently, the problem of "administrative resources", i.e., abuse of state resources for partisan purposes by the party in power, constitutes the most widespread concern with regards to further development of political freedom in Georgia. While the fairness of the electoral process visibly increased after the Rose Revolution, the real test will come when elections take part in the context of strong political competition.

2.1.2 Political competition. Political parties in Georgia act freely, and their existence ensures a fair level of political pluralism in Georgian politics. However, they are weakly institutionalized, oriented towards a single leader and have low levels of internal democracy. The party system is also rather unstable with major political players changing before each parliamentary or local election.

Since independence, Georgia's political scene has traditionally been dominated by a single "government party", led by a charismatic leader. Before the 'Rose Revolution', it was Eduard Shevardnadze's Citizens' Union of Georgia, and after the Revolution it was Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement. These parties were usually hard to distinguish from the government bureaucracy.

Currently the Georgian Parliament is dominated by a single party, the Unified National Movement of Georgia, which, in a coalition with formally non-aligned deputies, controls more than two thirds of the seats. Only one opposition bloc ("The Rightist Opposition"), including two parties, the New Conservatives and Industry Will Save Georgia, was able to overcome the 7% threshold for party lists in the 2004 elections, with 8% of the vote. In 2005, the opposition continued to be fragmented among different parties none of which could provide a credible alternative to the party in power. Opposition parties are focused on criticizing the government actions but do not propose alternative policies.

¹⁶ On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is the best.

2.1.3. Rule of law. Citizens have little confidence in the law enforcement system, especially the judiciary. Although the Constitution establishes a high level of independence of the judiciary, there are indications that in practice government pressure increased after the Rose Revolution (Mason, W., 2005).

After the Rose Revolution, the Freedom House rating for the Judicial Framework and Independence for Georgia deteriorated from 4.5 to 5 (assessing years 2003-2004) “owing to violations of due process by the prosecutor’s office and a decrease in the independence of the judiciary” (NIT, 2005, p. 3).¹⁷ In 2004, a controversial “plea bargain” system was introduced in Georgia, which was mostly applied to allegedly corrupt officials of the previous administration. According to this system, suspects bought their freedom by paying large sums of money to the state, without their cases reaching the courts. The Council of Europe criticised this system, as it created “the risk for arbitrary, abusive and even politically motivated application” (PACE, 2005).

The World Bank indicator of rule of law for Georgia shows a slight decrease for the period of 1998-2004 from -0.74 to -0.87.

2.1.4. Corruption. In 2003, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index assigned Georgia the score of 1.8¹⁸, which showed a deterioration (by score 0.6) compared with the 2002 status (score of 2.4). After the Rose Revolution the score for Georgia improved slightly to 2.0 in 2004, and then to 2.3 in 2005. This 2005 score places Georgia on 130th place among the 158 countries. In the Freedom House report, (Nations in Transit 2005), Georgia’s rating on corruption also increased slightly after the Rose revolution (score 5.75 against 6.0 in the previous year), but this rating is still rather low.

FIGURE III.2.2: TI CPI Georgia

Corruption Perception Index Transparency International		
Year	Country Rank	CPI score
2002	85	2.4
2003	124	1.8
2004	133	2.0
2005	130	2.3

In 2003, Darchiashvili and Nodia wrote that, in Georgia corruption has become so comprehensive and rampant that it has become a part of the general institutional crisis of the state (Darchiashvili, D. & Nodia, G., 2003). Georgia was described as being close to the model known as the Mafia-dominated state, where the ‘organised crime group provides protective services that substitute for those provided by the state in ordinary societies. In some cases the state and the mafia share the protection of business and perhaps even have overlapping membership’ (Rose-Ackerman 1999, quoted in Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003). After the Rose Revolution, the new government declared the fight against corruption its main priority, and achieved some visible successes in overcoming mass corruption in such areas as traffic police, issuing of documents such as citizens’ IDs, etc.

2.1.5. State effectiveness. The capacity of the state bureaucracy to fulfil its functions is limited substantively. The most important limitation is the failure to extend control of the Georgian state over two breakaway territories, the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali Region), which occupy some 15% of the country’s territory. There are also other indicators of state weakness, such as rather low salaries for public servants (some of them are still below the living wage), extremely low pensions for senior citizens

¹⁷ Based on a scale of 1 to 7

¹⁸ CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

(about 20% of the living wage) and the decrepit condition of large parts of public infrastructure, such as roads and the irrigation system.


Despite continuing serious problems, considerable progress has been made since the Rose Revolution, in strengthening state capacity. The local autocratic regime in the Autonomous Republic of Achara, which was showing separatist trends, was overthrown in a peaceful revolution and the region was integrated into the Georgian political system. The level of public revenues increased manifold, from 932 million Gel in 2003 to 3.26 billion in 2005, (JSC Galt & Taggart Securities Weekly Stock market Commentary, January 23, 2006), and public servants' salaries have increased considerably. Large-scale works started repairing public infrastructure, such as roads. Activities of some uncontrolled armed groups, such as Georgian "partisan" groups in the area of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, have been curbed, and violence on religious grounds, that was rampant and unpunished in the previous regime, was curbed and perpetrators put in jail.

The World Bank dataset provide information allowing comparing government effectiveness¹⁹ of different countries and through the certain course of time. The chart below compares Georgia with the effective state of Austria, on the one hand, and with Moldova having the same secessionist problems, on another hand. It shows similar pattern of deterioration for the both post-Soviet countries over the last decade. The mentioned WBI government effectiveness indicator points the fact that Georgia's government is not perceived as effective and also did not demonstrate any improvement of its ineffectiveness over the last ten years.

FIGURE III.2.3: WBI Governance Indicator –Government effectiveness (GRICS, 1996-2004)

2.1.6. Decentralization.

Local government in Georgia is weak and its competences, as well as resources, are extremely restricted. There are two levels of local government and self-government in Georgia. The first—and lower—is the municipal level—that of communities, which are governed by elected local councils and *gamebeli* (heads of the administration). There are more than 1000 such municipalities. The second level is that of the districts (*rayons*) and cities with heads of administration appointed by the country



¹⁹ Government Effectiveness combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies.

president. There are 56 such districts in the country apart from those of secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. According to Davit Losaberidze, the leading Georgian expert on the self-government issues, transfers from the central government amount to 90% of total revenues of local self-governance units (Tsereteli, N., 2004).

The Georgian state's total expenditures in 2004 amounted to 2468 million GL, while the expenditures of the local budgets were 682 million GL. Hence, the sub-national share of government expenditure was about 25% (Department of Statistics, 2006).

2.2. Basic freedoms and rights

This subdimension examines to what extent basic freedoms are ensured by law and in practice in the Georgia. Table III.2.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.2: Indicators assessing basic rights and freedoms

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.2.1	Civil liberties	1
2.2.2	Information rights	1
2.2.3	Press Freedom	1

2.2.1. *Civil liberties.* As far as civil liberties are concerned there are obvious discrepancies between law and practice in Georgia.

Article 2 of the Georgian Constitution provides guarantees for major civil rights, such as the freedom of expression, assembly and association. In practice, however, citizens' freedom of assembly is occasionally violated by the police, or disproportionate force is applied against the demonstrators.

Freedom House's survey, *Countries at the Crossroads* assigned a rather low rating of 3.9 for Civil Liberties in Georgia.²⁰ The study assessed protection from state terror, unjustified imprisonment, and torture; gender equity and minority rights; freedom of conscience and belief and freedom of association (Piano, A. 2004).

According to the Freedom House survey: "One of the most serious human rights problems in Georgia continues to be the torture and inhumane treatment of detainees by law-enforcement... According to amendments made in 1999 and 2000 to the criminal procedure code, those who are accused of crimes may not file complaints before a judge [of the constitutional court] regarding police abuse or ill-treatment. Although freedom of religious belief and the separation of church and state are guaranteed by the constitution, the Georgian Orthodox Church enjoys certain rights and privileges, including legal status, not available to other religious communities. During the past decade, it has become an increasingly outspoken force in the country's political decision-making and exerts a considerable degree of influence over public life... The state, with the consent of the Georgian Orthodox Church, decides whether other religious communities may build churches, publish religious literature, and produce items for worship (Piano, A. 2004, pp. 5-7)".

The Georgian Constitution prohibits discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds. However, public schools in predominantly Armenian and Azeri-populated regions lack adequate

²⁰ Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance.

Georgian language training, which effectively restricts these populations' access to employment and institutions of higher education.

Based on this information, the SAG assessed that there are frequent violations of civil liberties in Georgia.

2.2.2. Information rights. Georgia's administrative code includes the equivalent of the United States Freedom of Information act, which makes all government information accessible to the public. There is also the Law on State Secrets, which sets rules on the classification of information. However, in practice state agencies often create illegal impediments for citizens to access public information often ignoring such claims and/or releasing public information it only after repeated requests. The Freedominfo.org Global Survey notes that "the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy conducted a national survey of public accessibility of information in 2001 and found that it was still difficult for ordinary citizens to obtain information. 59% of the responses to the requests violated the law. The survey also found low awareness of the law among officials" (Banisar, D., 2004, p.35). After the Rose Revolution, access to public information has become more restricted in practice, with State bodies often being selective in releasing public information to those whom they consider friendly to the authorities. The Georgian Young Lawyers Association considers it necessary to introduce certain changes in legislation so that the courts immediately consider cases on denial of public information to citizens (Tevzadze, V., 2005).

As assessed by Freedom House, according to the country's performance until the Rose Revolution, "Georgia's budget-making and expenditure-accounting processes are generally comprehensive and open to scrutiny...Georgia's parliament is one of the country's more transparent state bodies and provides some information to citizens on government laws and policies. Draft legislation that does not have national security implications must, by law, be available to anyone. The regulations of the parliament of Georgia provide for public hearings by committees on bills" (Piano, A., 2004, p.14). Based on this assessment, the Freedom House survey, *Countries at Crossroads*, assigned a medium rating of 3.68 for accountability and public voice. (Piano, A. 2004).²¹

2.2.3. Press freedoms. The Law on the Press and Mass Media, adopted in 1991, declares the media to be independent and provides mechanisms for ensuring freedom of speech. The 2004 Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression took libel off the criminal code and relieved journalists of legal criminal responsibility for revealing state secrets (Georgian Laws, 2004). There is no official government censorship of the media; however, in practice the government has resources to exert pressure on the media. The media lacks economic independence since it is not commercially sustainable and is subsidized by tycoons from the ruling political elite. There are episodes of harassment of journalists by politicians and government bureaucrats as well as attempts of illegal censorship.

Since the Rose Revolution there has been a notable trend of reduction of media pluralism, especially in the most influential TV broadcasting media. On the 13th and 14th December 2004 respectively, the State Anti-Monopoly Service of Georgia requested that the television stations Imedi and Kavkasia suspend their broadcasts of community announcements sponsored by the European Commission and the Georgian NGO, Former Political Prisoners

²¹ scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance

for Human Rights (Georgia: Uncertain Torture Reform, 2005). This was likely to have been a consequence of the strained relationships of this organisation with the new government.

Freedom House, in its Nations in Transit 2005, wrote that “in the first half of 2004 independent TV stations became less daring in criticizing the government, a development that may be based on a combination of alleged behind-the-scenes government pressure and self-censorship. The economic base of the media is weak: independent TV companies are usually unprofitable and serve to promote the agenda of their owners. The professional quality of journalists is insufficient, and there are no strong formal associations to set professional and ethical standards for the industry”. FH reduced its rating for independent media in Georgia from 4.00 to 4.25, and Georgia’s ranking in terms of freedom of the press deteriorated from 114 in 2004 to 115 in 2005 (FP, 2005a) with the score of 56 (54 in 2004) and a status of Partly Free (FP, 2005b).

2.3. Socio-economic context

This subdimension analyses the socio-economic situation in Georgia. Table III.2.3 shows the respective indicator score.

Table III.2.3: Indicator assessing socio-economic context

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.3.1	Socio-economic context	<u>2</u>

To make the concept of ‘socio-economic environment’ operational, eight indicators were selected, which represent the different means through which the socio-economic context can potentially influence civil society: 1) Poverty; 2) Civil war; 3) Severe ethnic or religious conflict; 4) Severe economic crisis; 5) Severe social crisis; 6) Serious socio-economic inequities; 7) Illiteracy; 8) Lack of IT infrastructure.

For each of these indicators a specific benchmark was defined which indicated that the respective indicator presents a socio-economic barrier to civil society. The benchmarks and data for these eight indicators for Georgia are presented below:

1) Widespread poverty – do more than 40% of Georgians live on more than 2 US\$ a day? **No**. While there is not such a high level of widespread poverty, 12.4% of people in Georgia live on less than 2 USD per day (HDI, 2003). “According to the SDS data, in 2003 the poverty level was 54.5% to subsistence level and increased by 2.4% against 2002... Extreme poverty made 17.4% in the first 9 months of 2004, which is 0.8% higher than in 2003” (PRSP, 2005, p.4).

2) *Civil war - did the country experience any armed conflict during the last five years?* **No**. The government was violently overthrown in 1992, but there have been no similar incidents since. In November 2003, there was an extra-constitutional, but peaceful, change of power, following mass protest against election fraud. There was a danger of armed conflict, but it did not materialize. In May 2004, there was another extra-constitutional but peaceful change of power in Achara, an autonomous region within Georgia. This was another episode of the country standing on the brink of violence. One can summarise that the country has avoided violent power struggle for the last twelve years, but the political system has yet to stabilize.

3) *Severe ethnic or religious conflict - Did the country recently experience a severe conflict around self-determination?* **Yes**. There were two severe armed ethnic conflicts for secession

in Georgia: in 1991-93, in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Cease-fire agreements have been mainly effective here since 1994 in Abkhazia and since June 1992 in South Ossetia. However, these conflicts are unresolved and sporadic incidents of violence occur. The presence of approximately 230,000 IDPs from Abkhazia, 12,200 from South Ossetia and about 2,600 refugees from neighbouring Chechnya pose a continued threat to national stability (CRHRP, 2004).

In August 2004, tensions escalated in South Ossetia leaving more than twenty people dead. A new full-scale war was avoided, but low-scale violence, including the killing and kidnapping of people, persists (International Crisis Group, 2004). In the conflict zone in Abkhazia, on the other hand, there has been some improvement after the Rose Revolution, after the new government curbed activities of the Georgian armed partisan groups. According to the CIDCM Peace and Conflict Dataset Georgia deserved a medium rating (yellow)²² both in human security and self-determination categories for performance in 2002 as there were no severe conflicts or military escalation but frozen conflicts continue to exist in secessionist regions. (Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., 2003). However, due to deterioration of situation in South Ossetia in 2004 this rating was lowered.


4) *Severe economic crisis – is the external debt more than the GDP?* **No.** Georgia's external debt amounts to about 2 billion US dollars. According to the World Bank data (GDF, 2005) Georgia's external debt ratio to GNI²³ was 48% in 2003. According to European Commission data, "Georgia is in the group of lower middle income countries, with a GNI per capita of about \$830 (\$2,540 in terms of purchasing power parity). The economic hardship of the transition process is illustrated by the fact that real GDP remains at below 50% of the pre-transition level (1990) (CSWP, 2005, p.16)."

FIGURE III.2.4: Georgia - Selected Economic Indicators, 2000-2004

5) *Severe social crisis?* **No.** In the last two years no severe social crisis was experienced in Georgia.

6) *Severe socio-economic inequities, i.e. Gini index higher than 40?* **No.** According to the World Bank data Gini inequality index for Georgia for performance in 2001

was 36.9 (WDI, 2004) and 38.9 in 2003 (UNDP, 2005).²⁴



* Source CSPW, 2005, p. 17.

²² Countries are evaluated and placed into three ordered categories of peace-building capacity: red, yellow, and green. Red-flagged countries are considered to be at the greatest immediate risk of new outbreaks of violent societal conflicts and government instability; green-flagged countries enjoy the strongest prospects.

²³ Gross National Income

²⁴ A value of 0 represents perfect equality, a value of 100 perfect inequality

7) *Pervasive illiteracy - are more than 40% of the adult population illiterate?* **No.** According to the UNDP data on Adult Literacy Rate (% for age 15 and above) is not available; however, the net primary enrolment ratio in 1990 was 97% and deteriorated to 91% in 2001/2002 (HDR, 2004).

8) *Lack of IT infrastructure – are there less than 5 IT hosts per 10.000 inhabitants?* **No.** The share of Internet users in Georgia per 100 000 inhabitants constituted 15 in 2002 and went up to 31 in 2003 (WBG, 2005)

The analysis of civil society’s socio-economic environment showed that most of these socio-economic barriers are not present in Georgia. However, the threat of ethnic violent conflict escalation in the secessionist regions is a negative factor.

2.4. Socio-cultural context²⁵

This subdimension examines to what extent socio-cultural norms and attitudes are conducive or detrimental to civil society. Table III.2.4 summarises the respective indicator score.

Table III.2.4: Indicator assessing socio-cultural context

Ref. #	Indicator	Score
2.4.1	Tolerance	2

2.4.1. Tolerance. Georgians traditionally boast of being tolerant towards ethnic and religious minorities. However, in 1998-2003 there have been numerous episodes of violence against minority religious groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists Pentecostals, and other groups perpetrated by groups of religious fanatics and left unpunished by the government. In the last two years, religious violence was curbed and most notorious offenders put in jail. However, minority religious groups continue to suffer from restrictions of their rights, especially when it comes to building houses of worship. According to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour of the U.S. Department of State (CRHRP, 2004) the Constitution provides for freedom of religion; however, in practice, local authorities sometimes restricted the rights of members of non-traditional religious minority groups. There were fewer reports of violence against minority religious groups in 2005 year, but several groups continued to report intimidation by local authorities.

Restrictions against minority religious groups, especially the so called “non-traditional” religious communities, are supported by a large portion of the population. According to a poll conducted by Caucasian House, 35% said they would not like to be neighbours of Jehovah Witnesses and 20% would rather not be neighbours of Baptists (Gelashvili, N., 2004). There are hard-line Orthodox religious groups who preach aggressively illiberal views and question the acceptance of religious pluralism. Religious minorities are sometimes prevented from using homes as houses of worship by local communities. In 2003, a Baptist chapel was burnt in one Georgian village and in 2004 the neighbours did not allow it to be rebuilt.

There has been no aggressive behaviour towards ethnic minorities, though many people are prejudiced against ethnic minorities holding high-level position in the government. Accusations of “wrong” ethnic heritage are sometimes used against their political opponents even by mainstream politicians. The issue of homosexuality constitutes a taboo, and, with

²⁵ Two indicators proposed in the CSI methodology -Trust and Public Spiritedness- were taken out due to lack of reliable secondary data.

very few exceptions, it is not considered a matter for public discussion. No significant public figures are open about their homosexuality.

The SAG assessed the indicator based on the information presented above and assigned the score, which implies that the society is characterised by a rather low level of tolerance.

2.5. Legal environment

This subdimension examines the legal environment for civil society and assesses to what extent it is enabling or disabling for the civil society. Table III.2.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.5: Indicators assessing legal environment

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.5.1	CSO registration	2
2.5.2	Freedom of CSOs to criticise the government	1
2.5.3	Tax laws favourable to CSOs	1
2.5.4	Tax benefits for philanthropy	2

2.5.1. CSO registration. According to the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL, 2003) Georgian legislation establishes a sound legal basis for exercising the freedom of association. The Georgian Civil Code recognises two types of not-for-profit entities, unions and foundations. The process requires not more than one month and is affordable for average NGOs since not more than 40-50 USD are required including those of notary service. Both types of organisations are registered by the Ministry of Justice, and the Civil Code also recognises the right of unregistered associations to exist and grants them limited legal capacity. This is especially remarkable in view of the fact that several other NIS countries prohibit unregistered associations.

Georgia scores 3.9 for the dimension of legal environment on USAID's NGO Sustainability Index (NGOSI, 2004), assigning the country to the category of Mid-Transition (3-5).²⁶ This category implies that NGOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. However, organisations may suffer from inconveniences, due to a number of technical problems. For instance, registration of trade unions is made difficult by the legal requirement to bring at least hundred members (which is the minimum number of members to register a trade union) to the public notary.

Since the CSO registration process is considered to be simple, quick, and inexpensive but not always consistently applied the SAG assessed the CSO registration process to be overall relatively supportive.

2.5.2. Allowable advocacy activities. There are no legal restrictions for CSOs engaging in advocacy and criticizing government. In practice, civil society is rather vocal in criticizing government, and some of its advocacy efforts have lead to actual changes in legislation or government policies. After the Rose Revolution, the government became more selective in its relations with CSOs, refusing to cooperate with those whose political views it does not accept. In December 2004, video clips on police torture, prepared by Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, were removed from all television channels on the order of the Ministry of Security (CRHRP, 2004).

²⁶ 7 Indicating a low or poor level of development and 1 indicating a very advanced NGO sector

According to the NGO Sustainability Index, “Several NGOs were able to participate in the re-drafting [of Civil Code], and their suggestions were incorporated into the final Amendments. Enhanced legal capacity has enabled NGOs to successfully respond to numerous regressive legislative initiatives this [2003] year...NGOs thus quickly mobilised to protest a draconian draft law ‘On Prohibition of Extremist Organizations’, which would have rendered NGOs potentially liable to prosecution for contacts with any foreign entity” (NGOSI, 2003, p.81).

The SAG considered that constraints on CSOs’ advocacy activities exist, yet they are not clearly defined, but rather informal and politically motivated.

2.5.3. Tax laws favourable to CSOs. The most important tax exemptions for NGOs are instituted by the law on grants. Moneys received from grants are exempt from most taxes. Since grants from foreign foundations constitute the largest part of CSOs’ income, so far this kind of taxation regime has been largely positive for CSOs. CSOs only have to pay income tax on salaries and fees, while VAT has to be paid and later was supposed to be reimbursed by the State. However, a study conducted by Civil Society Institute found that most NGOs are unable to claim reimbursement of their VAT (NGOSI, 2003). After the Rose Revolution, this situation improved, though regaining VAT takes a lot of time and persistence.

The new tax code, enacted in January 2005, instituted a status of charitable organisations that are eligible to receive charitable donations from local businesses.

2.5.4. Tax benefits for philanthropy. Until 2004, there were no tax exemptions for businesses or individuals encouraging their charitable donations. A January 2005, Tax Code instituted such exemptions: The amount of donations given to a charitable organisation by the enterprise will be deducted from the income, but no more than 8% of the sum after taxes. Entity receiving such a tax has to be registered as a charitable body (Nodia, G., 2005, p. 38). Though donations from individuals are not exempted, this does not present a disincentive, since personal income tax is fixed (for average as well as higher incomes) and fairly low (12%).

2.6. State-civil society relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the Georgian state. Table III.2.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.6: Indicators assessing state-civil society relations

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
<u>2.6.1</u>	Autonomy of CSOs	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.2</u>	Dialogue between CSOs and the state	<u>2</u>
<u>2.6.3</u>	Support for CSOs on the part of the state	<u>1</u>

2.6.1. Autonomy. “Freedom of association is effectively protected by the Georgian Civil Code. Overall, Georgian legislation provides a relatively favourable climate for the development of civil society. (...) The Georgian Constitution and law provide the right for citizens to form and join trade unions” (CSWP, 2005, pp.11-12). On the other hand, the practice does not always conform to the good legislation. The Georgian government does not try to openly interfere in the internal affairs of CSOs. However, it is believed to use indirect ways to influence activities of some of them.

This is especially true of the most influential of CSOs: the electronic media. Since the Rose Revolution, two independent media companies, Rustavi-2 and Mze, were bought by people close to the government (personal friend of the acting minister of defence and brother of the secretary of the Security Council). Levers that the government can use to influence the media are largely economic. “Most regional and local media outlets struggle to be commercially viable. As a consequence, many are forced to depend on local officials and businesspeople for financial support and are subject to their editorial influence” (Piano, A., 2004, p. 17). On the other hand, most of other CSOs depend on grants by foreign foundations which make them less dependent on the State.

In the past year, the State increased its pressure on trade unions, which it considers a ‘residue’ of the Soviet era. As a result, trade unions had to give large portions of their assets to the State. The deputy chairman of the United Trade Unions, charged with serious criminal offences was arrested, but released from jail after the trade union agreed to transfer a substantial part of its property to the state.

According to the U.S. Department of State 2004 data, domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. While some NGOs enjoyed free access and close cooperation with the Government, others complained of discrimination from government members (CRHRP, 2004). An example of such discrimination is provided in the text of indicator 2.2.3.

2.6.2. Dialogue. Dialogue between NGOs and the State does exist, but in many cases it is not institutionalized and those organisations which are more critical of the government tend to be excluded from the dialogue. Some ministries (such as ministry of justice, ministry of defence, and others) have advisory councils, mainly consisting of civil society activists, which provide for dialogue, but in some cases these councils exist on paper, but rarely meet. There are also occasional meetings between high officials, including the president, and groups of civil society activists and/or publicly active intellectuals. Other forms for dialogue between the government and civil society are TV talk shows or conferences organised by CSOs. Members of civil society are often included in different governing boards appointed by the government (for instance, the public television board), or working groups that develop different government strategy documents. Through these different forms of dialogue, CSOs sometimes succeed in influencing policy decisions: for instance, the schoolteachers’ trade unions succeeded in making certain changes to the law on education.

2.6.3. Support for CSOs on the part of the state. As compared to other sources of CSOs’ income, funding from State agencies is insignificant. “Procurement regulations provide sufficient flexibility for Non Entrepreneurial Organizations to participate in state procurement” (NGOSI, 2003, p. 81). However, CSOs’ experience participating in state procurement is very limited. Partly due to widespread nepotism and cronyism within the state agencies, partly due to their reputation as unreliable business partners, NGOs and the State did not show much willingness to deal with each other on the basis of procurement contracts. Only a handful of NGOs, e.g. the Inter-Sectoral Research Group, have participated in state procurement. However, there are some recent changes, since in 2004 some state agencies, including the ministry of education and science, the ministry of culture and sports, and the Tbilisi city government, began to implement special programmes through grant-giving to the NGOs on a competitive basis.

2.7. Private sector-civil society relations

This subdimension describes and assesses the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector. Table III.2.7 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.2.7: Indicators assessing private sector – civil society relations

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
2.7.1	Private sector attitude to Civil Society	1
2.7.2	Corporate social responsibility	1
2.7.3	Corporate philanthropy	1

2.7.1. Private sector attitude. Overall the relationship between the private sector and civil society and the private sector's attitude towards civil society has been unfavourable. According to a sociological survey carried out by Tbilisi State university in 2002 attitudes of the businessmen towards NGOs were as follows: 19.3% - negative; 19.3% – rather negative than positive; 50.2% – rather positive than negative, 11.2% positive. (Kachkachishvili, J., 2002)

This is, in part, due to the nature of business in Georgia. «Relations between CSOs and business have been insubstantial throughout the existence of the sector. The state of business in the country – the large share of the shadow economy (according to some estimates under the last government it was around 70%), the imperfect tax system, the lack of consistent State policies, the lack of legislation on charity until very recently – created an unfavourable background for the development of a relationship between the third sector and business” (Nodia, G., 2005, p. 45). There are episodes of business organisations supporting specific activities of CSOs, but they are rather sporadic, and there are no lasting and institutionalized forms of cooperation between the Georgian business and CSOs.

2.7.2. Corporate social responsibility. In 2004, more than 2000 businessmen participated in drafting and adopting of the Georgian Business Code of Conduct. The aim of the code is that growth in corporate responsibility, the establishment of new values and the improvement of organisational culture, on the part of businesses, will have a positive impact on Georgian businesses (MARNET Conference, 2005). However, it is still too early to evaluate its effect on the actual behaviour of the corporate sector in this regard.

Large corporations, such as British Petroleum (BP), have some programmes designed to demonstrate their social responsibility. However, CSOs have very limited capacity to influence their decisions concerning key social problems, such as environmental protection. For instance, Georgian NGOs, international environmental NGOs and some other NGOs were unable to convince BP to change the route of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline so it would avoid the Borjomi National Park, which has extremely valuable mineral water resources.

2.7.3. Corporate philanthropy. There are few CSOs that receive financial support from the Georgian private sector, and this support is usually irregular and related to one-off activities. There is no specific data measuring the shares of different sources of funding for Georgian CSOs. However, based on expert estimates one can conclude that the extent of resources received by CSOs from Georgian private businesses is insignificant as compared to other sources of funding. The Georgian Orthodox Church is the only exception. Indirect evidence suggests that Georgian businessmen often donate generously to the Church, especially for the

construction of the new Church buildings.

A survey carried out in 2002 revealed that 64% of businessmen consider private sector support to NGOs insufficient. This estimation is notable as far as only 18% of businessmen have experience collaborating with NGOs and only 17% supported them financially. Those businessmen that made donations choose to target persons directly or establish their own charity funds, rather than collaborate with existing NGOs. On the other hand, 61percent of those without charitable experience do not exhibit a willingness to collaborate with existing NGOs as they think their donations will not reach the target group (Kachkachishvili, J ., 2002).

One of the reasons for the deficit in partnerships between business and the third sector may be that the business community cannot see the connection between the level of development of civil society and a favourable environment for investment.

On the side of CSOs, 60% of organisations have never had any relations with business organisations. Of the organisations which had any relations with business, 9% received financial assistance from them, 25% provided services for businesses and 13% conducted joint activities with business representatives (Nodia, G., 2005, p. 46).

As corporate philanthropy is weakly developed in Georgia, the SAG assign a low score, implying that only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.

Conclusion

The SAG considered the political context and the state of basic freedoms to be the most negative aspects of the environment for civil society in Georgia. In this regard, the situation is somewhat contradictory. Legislation is generally rather supportive of civil and political rights. Both by law and in practice citizens can freely create and join political and civic organisations, as well as voice and defend their opinions. The media is often strongly critical of the government. At the same time, people have rather low levels of trust in the rule of law, especially in the judiciary, as well as in the fairness of the electoral process. While political competition is not hindered, in effect the political scene is dominated by a single political party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia until November 2003 and United National Movement afterwards, which tends to use State resources for partisan needs. Thus, the political process is not competitive, and a multitude of weakly institutionalized opposition parties do not represent credible alternatives to the party in government. There are frequent allegations of hidden governmental pressure against the media, as well as occasional harassment of journalists. The power is concentrated in the executive with Parliament or other levels of government not able to provide effective checks and balances.

State capacity is generally low and corruption remains substantial. The new government, which came to power after the Rose Revolution, achieved important successes in curbing mass corruption and increasing the state's capacity, but more has to be done in this regard.

However, despite the negative political context, civil society's legal environment is mainly conducive since the CSO registration process is rather user-friendly and cost-effective and since there are recently instituted tax benefits for philanthropy. While a number of CSOs are involved in the dialogue with the State and are able to influence State policies, the government is rather selective in selecting partners for dialogue and tends to exclude a large part of civil society actors. Cooperation between civil society actors and the business community is rather rudimentary.


By and large, Georgian society shows fairly low levels of tolerance towards religious minorities, and different ethnic groups sometimes demonstrate hostile attitudes towards the prospect of civic integration superseding ethnic boundaries. The existence of unresolved ethno-territorial conflicts in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia is conducive to simmering ethno-nationalist sentiments.

Due to this myriad of challenging factors in the political, social and economic spheres, the environment in which Georgian civil society operates can be described as rather disabling.

3. VALUES

This section describes and analyses the values promoted and practiced by Georgia's civil society. The score for the Values Dimension is 1.7., reflecting an overall relatively significant positive value basis of Georgia's civil society. Figure III.3.1 presents the scores for the seven subdimensions within the Values dimension. While the democracy subdimension scores lower than average, the low score for poverty eradication stands out as a distinctively problematic area. The scores for Tolerance, Non-Violence, Transparency, and Gender Equity are rather high and make the values dimension the strongest among the four dimensions of Georgian civil society Diamond.

FIGURE III.3.1: Subdimension scores in values dimension



3.1. Democracy

This subdimension examines the extent to which Georgia's civil society actors practice and promote democracy. Table III.3.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.1: Indicators assessing democracy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.1.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	<u>1</u>
3.1.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	<u>2</u>

3.1.1 Democratic practices within CSOs. The level of democracy in most Georgian CSOs is considered insufficient by the SAG. In particular, while the manner of decision-making is rather democratic, the process of selecting leaders is often ridden with problems. When leadership selection happens to be contested in some CSOs, it may lead to open confrontations and tensions within organisations. For instance, the elections of the leader in the Amalgamation of the Georgian Trade Unions in the fall of 2005 led to physical abuse.

According to the result of the survey conducted by the UN Association of Georgia, only in 17% of the 184 organisations interviewed, directors personally make decisions about ongoing activities. In about one-fourth (23%) of organisations decisions are taken by the team, either by the full staff or by the executive team of decision-makers. This is done according to the procedures prescribed in their internal statutes or by following other procedures (CSR DG and UNAG, 2005).

In half of the organisations, during the entire period of their existence, members of the Boards have remained the same. In only one-third of the organisations the make-up of the Board has changed and been filled by staff members of the organisation, based on the principle of rotation. In other cases the changes in the Board constituency were mainly caused by the personal desire of its members (e. g. resignation, changing the place of residence). The majority of CSOs functioning in Georgia do not change their Boards involving new people from the outside or do this very rarely.

3.1.2 CS actions to promote democracy. Civil Society played an important role in influencing the democratic processes in the country, specifically in the lead-up to the Rose Revolution in 2003 (NGOSI, 2004). NGOs also played a pivotal and highly visible role in the Parliamentary elections in 2003. NGOs across the country participated in voter education through training, media campaigns and distribution of educational materials. The UN Association of Georgia managed an Elections Media Centre, which was a primary source of information for the media on election projects and monitoring missions. An influential voice during the Parliamentary election campaigns came from “Kmara” (Enough), a student movement led by a number of NGO activists. Two NGOs, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) and Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) led nationwide election monitoring missions, and it was ISFED’s appeal to the Constitutional Court that annulled the proportional election results.

Civil society’s “influence [on political processes] and visibility dropped somewhat during the first half of 2004. One of the reasons for this is that a number of leading NGO activists have joined the government” (NIT, 2005, pp.9-10).

3.2. Transparency

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Georgia’s civil society actors practice and promote transparency. Table III.3.2 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.2: Indicators assessing transparency

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.2.1	Democratic practices within CSOs	<u>2</u>
3.2.2	Civil society actions to promote democracy	<u>1</u>
3.2.3	Civil Society actions to promote transparency	<u>2</u>

3.2.1 Corruption within civil society. No instances of corruption in the nongovernmental sector have been publicly revealed. However, discussions among NGO representatives show that issues such as double accounting may exist (the taxation office and the donors receive different financial information) or organisations may receive funding from different donors for the same activity.

The Georgian society does have ambiguous attitude towards the issue of corruption within CSOs. According to a research study one quarter of the interviewed considered NGOs (local as well as international) as corrupted (Kachkachishvili, J., 2003). This opinion, which is not shared widely, could be understood as being influenced by the grave corruption in the country's public sector and the low financial transparency of the CSOs.


The SAG considered that there are only occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CSOs.

3.2.2 Financial transparency of CSOs. In recent years, a group of leading Georgian CSOs took the lead in introducing higher standards of financial transparency. This implies an introduction of international standards of financial management, regular external audits and making core financial information available for the public. Cooperation with international donors was an important motivation for the Georgian organisations to introduce higher standards of financial transparency.

NGOs acknowledge the importance of audits and financial transparency in general. However, audits usually are carried out at the request and expense of donors (NGOSI, 2003, p 5).

FIGURE III.3.2: Practice of financial audit in CSOs

The figure above shows that financial transparency of Georgian CSOs improved over the last three years, mainly due to their increased accountability to their donors; however, the share of CSOs making their annual financial reports publicly available is still lower than 30%.



3.2.3 CS actions to promote transparency. Georgian civil society considers the deficit of

*Source: Nodia, G., 2005, pp. 75-39.

transparency in the government institutions one of the most important problems facing the country (see indicator 2.1.4.). Respectively, activities aimed at increasing the transparency of government agencies through monitoring, awareness-raising and empowering of local communities constitutes an important priority of a large number of CSOs and the media. According to the research conducted by the UN Association of Georgia and CSRDG, in 2002 40% and in 2005 36% of interviewed organisations carried out monitoring of government activities (CSRDG&UNAG, 2005). CSOs also proposed anti-corruption strategies or participated in drafting the government's anti-corruption strategies. There are far fewer projects aimed at monitoring activities of business organisations.

For example, CSRDG implements the project “Local governance for and with people”, which is aimed at confronting corruption through enhancing administrative accountability and promoting citizens' participation in decision-making process. The fact that the Tbilisi Mayor’s Office regularly sends to the CSRDG approved budget of the city, which is accessible on their web-site to all interested parties, serves as evidence of their mandate being acknowledged. Another example is the Georgian Young Economists Association carrying out a large project of state budget monitoring.

The SAG based its assessment on civil society’s considerable activism to promote public sector transparency, but also its relative passivity with regards to corporate sector and the insufficient visibility of its initiatives.

3.3 Tolerance

This subdimension examines the extent to which Georgia’s civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance. Table III.3.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.3: Indicators assessing tolerance

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.3.1	Tolerance within the civil society arena	<u>2</u>
3.3.2	Civil society activities to promote tolerance	<u>2</u>

3.3.1 Tolerance within the CS arena. In general, Georgian civil society – as represented by NGOs – is considered to be the most active defender of values of tolerance and provides a good example of exercising tolerance in its practices. There are organisations that preach intolerance and are aggressively intolerant in their actions, but they are rather marginal. As to the media, its attitudes are mixed, with expressions of intolerant or insensitive attitudes frequently expressed by different media outlets.

Issues of religion are the most important with regards to problems of tolerance in Georgia. After the demise of the Soviet Union the Georgian Orthodox Church tried to occupy a more prominent role in the State, as well as in society at large (Gurgenidze, P., 2002). The level of religiosity within society increased as well. On the other hand, other religious groups, especially of western Protestant origin, increased their activities, including in some instances active proselytizing. Against this backdrop, several faith-based organisations were created that aimed to strengthen the positions of the leading Orthodox Church and expressed concern with regards to activism of other churches. The Union of Iberians, Queen Ketevan Society, Congregation Union of Davit Aghmashenebeli and the Union of Orthodox Parents are examples of such organisations. These types of organisations mainly become active in the contest of specific conflict situations. For instance, as a result of their protests regarding the draft agreement between Vatican and Georgia, the agreement failed (Nodia, G., 2005, pp.61-65). These organisations often express intolerant attitudes towards other denominations that they consider a threat to Georgian identity. Before the Rose Revolution, some Orthodox organisations were involved in violence against religious minorities, but the new authorities imprisoned the perpetrators thus curbing the tide of religious violence.

3.3.2 CS actions to promote tolerance. A number of Georgian CSOs work on promoting tolerance, and there are several that largely focus on this issue, such as: the Liberty Institute, promoting religious pluralism; the Public Movement Multinational Georgia, which aims at

promoting ethnic tolerance and a culture of diversity in the country and the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, the International Centre for Conflict and Negotiations and the newly established Civil Integration Foundation have programmes on research, awareness raising and training on promoting values of pluralism. This programme aims to promote a culture of tolerance at all levels of Georgian society, focusing on issues of ethnic minorities' integration.

The SAG's assessment was based on the substantial activism of the CSOs in order to promote culture of tolerance in the country, which, however, lacks broad-based public support.

3.4. Non-violence

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Georgian civil society actors and organisations practice and promote non-violence. Table III.3.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.4: Indicators assessing non-violence

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.4.1	Non-violence within the CS arena	<u>2</u>
3.4.2	CS actions to promote non-violence	<u>2</u>

3.4.1 Non-violence within the CS arena. While there has been a trend of violence by radical faith-based organisations (see indicator 3.3.1), this was denounced by other Georgian civil society actors, and in the last two years incidents of CSO-related violence have become rare.

Violent actions by orthodox groups against Jehovah's Witnesses and Baptists were frequent until 2003. In 1999 through 2001 alone, more than 700 such cases of violence were reported. Of all the extremists, the group led by the defrocked Georgian Orthodox priest, Basil Mkalavishvili (known as Father Basili) was particularly active (Zurabishvili, D., 2003, p. 24). After Mkalavishvili was arrested in 2003, no violent actions against non-traditional religious minorities were committed by his followers. After the Rose Revolution, there were only some isolated incidents of violence related to faith-based organisations. For example, members of the Congregation of David Aghmashenebeli physically abused Pentecostals. Also, a United Trade-Unions Council session was violently broken up by a group of trade union members in June 2005. But such instances are rare and violence does not go beyond fist-fights.

3.4.2 CS actions to promote non-violence and peace. Most Georgian CSOs support non-violent resolutions of conflicts, and there is an informal network of organisations that focus specifically on this issue. This network is mainly involved in confidence-building work, related to the two "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but it also aims to promote a culture of peace in Georgian society in general. These initiatives and approaches do not have broad public support, probably because most of the public believes that conflict settlement primarily depends on the outside players. However, there is a trend of increasing visibility and public support for non-violent means of resolving conflicts.

CSOs working on conflict resolution and peace work both independently and in cooperation with each other. For instance, the Anti-Violence National Network (AVNN), founded by seven leaders of the women's movement in Georgia, was established in October 2003. In 2004, another Coalition of Georgian Women's Rights NGOs joined the AVNN to ensure the maximum involvement of women in combating gender violence. The network seeks to

contribute to the building of a non-violent society by raising government and public awareness on the problem of domestic violence.

3.5. Gender Equity

This subdimension refers to how much Georgian civil society actors practice and promote gender equity. Table III.3.5 summarises respective indicator scores.

Table III.3.5: Indicators assessing gender equality

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.5.1	Gender equity within the CS arena	<u>2</u>
3.5.2	Gender equitable practices within CSOs	<u>1</u>
3.5.3	CS actions to promote gender equity	<u>2</u>

3.5.1 Gender equity within the CS arena. Women are active in civil society and many hold leadership positions in important NGOs, not only those working on gender issues. According to the findings of REC Caucasus survey, in 2001 an equal number of men and women worked in environmental organisations: 321 women and 332 men worked as paid employees in environmental organisations in total (REC Caucasus, 2001). However, the number of women in leadership positions is still much smaller than that of men. For instance, in a 2002 study, conducted among 2713 NGOs registered in Georgia, only 808 or 29% of organisations were headed by women. Although there are important female political leaders, no important political party is headed by a woman.

3.5.2 Gender equitable practices within CSOs. Only a very small number of organisations have any formal procedures to promote gender equity within their organisations. However, many organisations have informal policies to that end. The SAG considered that the CSOs practicing gender equity comprise minority (from 20 to 50%) and assigned the respective score.

3.5.3 CS actions to promote gender equity. There are quite a few CSOs in Georgia that work on issues of gender equity, and their number is growing. According to the Countrywide Assessment of Georgian CSOs, 22 (1.7%) of the 189 surveyed CSOs indicated women's issues as their primary area of work (CSR DG&UNAG, 2005). Such organisations tend to create networks and coalitions. In October 2000, the Coalition of Women NGOs was established with the assistance of ODIHR, which unites around 40 Georgian NGOs. Another coalition, Women Political Network, which unites eight NGOs, works to improve the political status of women in the country. Nevertheless, its attempts to promote gender equity principles in the electoral code have not been successful as far as Georgian politicians as well as the general public do not consider gender equity as a pressing issue for Georgia.

However, the level of consolidation of women's NGOs is rather low. Organizations focused on gender issues tend to unite around a certain project or short-term task, but not around a general idea or long term mission (Gaprindashvili, L., 2003). The reason behind the women's NGOs inability to effectively unify under umbrella bodies is the same as for the whole civil society, namely fear of losing independence (see indicator 1.4.1.). As a result, so far there have not been successful wide campaigns to promote gender equity issues that reached high level of public visibility.

3.6. Poverty Eradication

This subdimension examines to what extent Georgian civil society actors promote poverty eradication. Table III.3.6 presents the indicator score.

Table III.3.6: Indicator assessing power eradication

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.6.1	CS actions to eradicate poverty	1

3.6.1 CS actions to eradicate poverty. There are a number of organisations in Georgia that focus on poverty eradication by carrying out programmes for relevant target groups as well as by supporting and lobbying government policies aimed at poverty eradication. However, public visibility of such work is low, and civil society as a whole does not give priority to these issues since Georgia's intellectual elite and opinion makers within the CSO community do not prioritize poverty eradication within the overall agenda of the country's democratization and development processes.

As far as the grassroots level is concerned, community mobilization is the most common tool for programmes aiming at poverty eradication (see indicator 4.1.2.). Many organisations target specific marginalized groups such as senior citizens, street children and orphans.

However, certain CSOs are active at the policy level, especially when donors request civil society involvement. The participation of CSOs in developing the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program (EDPRP) of the Georgian government can serve as a good example of the country's civil society involvement in tackling the issue of poverty eradication. The EDPRP was developed in close consultations with civil society, international organisations and donor countries. In order to involve civil society in the programme elaboration, implementation and monitoring, a network of independent observers consisting of representatives from 15 Georgian CSOs (including think tanks, advocacy groups or organisations with diverse constituencies²⁷) was established in 2001. They analyzed the government draft of the programme, presented expert conclusions and recommendations and informed the public about the programme. Its final version was adopted in June 2003.

Another example of civil society activism aimed at poverty eradication is the Future Without Poverty, a civic alliance established in 2005 by Oxfam GB Georgia, the Association of Young Economists of Georgia, the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Welfare Foundation, Business League and the Women's Advice Centre *Sakhli*. The Alliance joins with the international movement, the Global Call to Action against Poverty. The alliance seeks to lobby the Georgian government to put the Millennium Development Goals on its agenda and achieve them through effective measures by the year 2015 (PSI, 2004).

The SAG assigned a low score to the indicator since civil society activities in this field are not visible and most civil society actors do not prioritize poverty eradication despite a considerably high level of poverty.

3.7. Environmental sustainability

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Georgian civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability. Table III.3.7 presents the indicator score.

²⁷ [http://www.psigeorgia.org/pregp/prsp_watcher's_network_\(in_eng\).htm](http://www.psigeorgia.org/pregp/prsp_watcher's_network_(in_eng).htm)

Table III.3.7: Indicator assessing environmental sustainability

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
3.7.1	CS actions to sustain the environment	2

3.7.1 CS actions to sustain the environment. There is a large network of environmental organisations in Georgia, some of which are well developed and carry out many activities in relevant areas. There are several networks of ecological organisations, among which the Caucasus Environmental NGOs Network is especially active. However, the efforts of these organisations are not strongly integrated in the activities of civil society in general, and they fail to mobilise broad public support and lack high degree of public visibility. Most people who could be considered opinion-makers within the civil society see its priorities elsewhere, namely in enforcing standards of democracy and human rights.

Environmental organisations differ by resources, capabilities, and the focus of their work. They are active in monitoring activities of business organisations: The work of British Petroleum, which carries out the largest economic project in Georgia, the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, attracted particularly strong attention of environment protection organisations. They also work to raise public awareness and propose alternative policies on ecological issues. According to the Regional Ecological Centre of Caucasus, CSOs play the role of facilitators for making public involvement more effective.

However, the capacity of ecological organisations to influence government policies is rather limited. While developing specific ecological policies, government agencies responsible for environmental protection usually include a single CSO in their working groups, which does not have significant leverage to influence the decision-making. This lack of leverage mainly stems from the fact that the network of environmental organisations has yet to create effective mechanisms for involving broader society in the decision-making process over ecological issues (REC Caucasus, 2001).

Conclusion

The core of Georgian CSOs, such as NGOs and the media, have rather clear priorities: they include promoting democracy, rule of law and human rights. NGOs are also seen as the main champions of minority rights, especially relating to religious groups. The value of (religious) tolerance, however, is little spread beyond the community of foreign-funded NGOs, and the media often tends to spread messages that are insensitive towards minorities or even breed intolerance. On the other hand, there are aggressively intolerant organisations that usually present themselves as champions of Orthodox faith. Another priority for Georgian civil society is the promotion of non-violence and peace, which is due to the two unresolved ethnic territorial conflicts in the country.

The values mentioned above constitute the core of the civil society agenda in Georgia. They can be considered central for Georgian civil society since activities in this area have the highest level of public visibility, and since this is the area where the most active, well-known and committed civil groups carry out their work.

There are also fairly strong networks of organisations that work on issues like gender equity, poverty eradication or environmental protection. However, these issues are not considered major concerns among the mainstream of Georgia's civil society. Most influential leaders and organisations believe that deficits of environment protection or gender equity, while they may


exist, do not constitute the most pressing concerns for Georgia, and the limited resources of civic activism should be directed elsewhere. These issues are also rarely exposed by the Georgian media. While everybody agrees that poverty is certainly the most pressing concern for Georgian society today, most Georgian CSOs think that this issue should be solved within the general context of liberal economic reforms, developing democracy and rule of law and eradicating corruption. An emphasis on social protection programmes is largely identified with the Communist past and is less popular among the third sector, but it is an important part of the agenda of political parties.

The main concern emerging from the analysis of the values dimension is that the Georgian community of CSOs does not always practice the values that they preach. The level of transparency has been low for a long time; however, there is considerable progress in the last few years. The level of internal democracy is often considered low because most organisations are centred on one, or a few, leaders and their personal relations. This correlates to the above mentioned issue of insufficient involvement of the public in CSOs: most organisations are only formally membership-based and do not represent specific constituencies. As this is the case, procedures of internal democracy are also formal. Last but not least, an undue focus on common agendas and values within civil society sometimes leads to a low level of pluralism and tolerance towards different opinions within the NGO community itself.

4. IMPACT

This section describes and analyses the extent to which civil society is active and successful in fulfilling several essential functions within Georgian society. The score for the Impact Dimension is 1.4, reflecting limited level of impact of Georgia's civil society. Figure III.4.1 presents the scores for the five subdimensions within the Impact dimension.

FIGURE III.4.1: Subdimension scores in impact dimension



4.1 Influencing Public Policy


This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Georgia's civil society is active and successful in influencing public policy in the fields of social policy and human rights policy as well as its impact on the national budgeting process. Table III.4.1 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.1: Indicators assessing influencing public policy

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.1.1	Human Rights impact	<u>2</u>
4.1.2	Social policy impact	<u>1</u>
4.1.3	Impact on national budgeting process	<u>1</u>

USAID's NGO Sustainability Index offers an assessment of Georgian NGO's advocacy activities and their success over the years. The dynamic of this indicator over the years from 1998 to 2004 are illustrated on the chart below showing that it has been improved since 2002 but still is far from the result of 2000.

FIGURE III.4.2: Advocacy (NGOSI, 2004)



4.1.1. Civil society's impact on Human Rights Issues. Human rights issues are central to the civil society agenda in Georgia. Civil society's efforts in this area have a relatively high level of public visibility so that leading human rights advocacy organisations, such as Liberty Institute or Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, are quite well-known among the wider public. Some initiatives of human rights organisations influence government policies and practices. However, overall the impact of these activities is limited.

The issues of torture and abuse of suspects and prisoners in police stations, as well as the penitentiary system, are particularly important issues on civil society's human rights agenda. In October 2004, a monitoring council, mainly comprised of NGOs representatives was created under the Ministry of Interior to visit police stations and places of temporary detention. A similar council has been operating under the Ministry of Interior and is focused on monitoring human rights issues in the penitentiary system. The reduction of instances of torture in preliminary detention facilities during the last two years has been largely accredited to active monitoring efforts of CSOs and their cooperation with the authorities. As proposed by CSOs, reports of injuries of prisoners when transferred from the custody of the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice are now investigated automatically and the internal monitoring within the Office of the Procurator General was strengthened. In at least one case, the government attempted to restrict public debate about the police's involvement in torture (see indicator 2.2.3). However, determined action on the part of one of the CSOs (namely FPPHR) has helped to lift the restriction (HRW, 2005).

4.1.2. Civil society's impact on social policy. CSOs in Georgia attempt to influence the state's social policies, but their efforts in this area are less noticeable and effective than in others. Most developed organisations that are able to mobilise support for specific agendas focus on issues of democracy and human rights and do not consider values of social equity worth prioritizing.

There are some areas, however, where the activities of CSOs did impact social policy. For example, as a result of efforts by a working group created within the framework of GCMI, a

USAID-funded programme, the Georgian Parliament adopted legislation supporting greater inclusion of disabled children in different contexts of social life. (Chatwin, M. E., 2004, p.2).

There are different opinions of how effective civil society was on influencing the outcome of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program (initially referred to as the PRSP), a fundamental document defining social policy of the government. An NGO coalition sponsored by OXFAM criticised the PRSP drafted by the government, which during working on the second draft included two representatives of civil society in the editorial commission. “The Interim PRSP was prepared and submitted during 2001, with minimal consultation. The full PRSP, called the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Program (EDPRP), was completed in June 2003. NGOs organised themselves in the PRSP Watchers Network, but it was hard for civil society to exert any influence on the process” – wrote OXFAM (Oxfam Briefing Paper, 2004, p. 43). On the other hand, the IMF in its Country Report acknowledged the role of CSOs stating that the final EDPRP was developed in close consultation with civil society (IMF Country Report, 2005).

4.1.3. Civil society’s impact on National Budgeting process. Government budgets on the national and local level are submitted by the executive branch and after a usually long process of deliberations and bargaining, adopted by the legislative branches. Georgian CSOs try to both influence the process of deliberations and monitor budget expenditures, but the focus is usually on the second stage.

CSOs have developed considerable experience in monitoring government budget expenditures on the national and local levels. However, civil society has limited means to influence decisions on budget planning. According to the NGO Sustainability Index, “NGOs are increasingly using the legislative tools at their disposal to monitor government, such as Young Economists’ monitoring of Zugdidi and Kutaisi municipal budgets. (NGOSI, 2003, p. 83) ”. However, no comparable research was carried out to measure the impact of such monitoring on the national budgeting process. For example, the Georgian Young Economists’ Association also prepares a regular bulletin in the framework of their “Budget Monitoring” project. The objective of the project is to, “provide transparency of state finance expenditures and influence the budgetary processes by monitoring the national state budget and budget of city of Kutaisi City” (Budget Monitoring, 2005). However, there is no evidence that such projects have direct influence on budget decisions or lead to lively public debate concerning specific issue related to state or local budgets.

4.2. Holding state and private corporations accountable

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Georgian civil society is active and successful in holding the state and private corporations accountable. Table III.4.3 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.3: Indicators assessing holding state and private corporations accountable

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.2.1	Holding the state accountable	<u>2</u>
4.2.2	Holding private corporations accountable	<u>1</u>

4.2.1. Holding state accountable. Georgian civil society is fairly active in monitoring state performance. There are some successful cases when CSOs’ activism led to holding state agencies accountable. However, the overall impact of these activities is limited. Apart from

the cases of torture in preliminary detention facilities, one can also mention the documentary that highlighted the inappropriate economic activities of one of Georgia's MPS, from the ruling party, which was produced in 2005, and eventually led to him giving up his parliamentary seat.

Out of 189 CSOs surveyed throughout Georgia only two named the task of monitoring of state agencies' activities as their priority, another two specialized on monitoring elections; 7 (3.7%) focused on anti-corruption activities and 23 (12.2%) on self-governance and local governance (Devdariani, J., 2003). However, this does not mean the other organisations do not play any watchdog role towards the state. According to the research conducted by the UN Association of Georgia and CSRDG, in 2002 40% and in 2005 36% of interviewed organisations carried out monitoring of government activities (CSRDG&UNAG, 2005).

Throughout 2004, local NGOs raised the issue of ongoing police abuse and torture, but with little response from the government. However, towards the end of the year the government appeared to listen (HRW, 2005). A new plan for unhindered monitoring of places of temporary detention and police stations was discussed at a meeting of President Saakashvili and other high level officials with Georgian NGOs. As a result of this pressure, a monitoring council was created to visit police stations and places of temporary detention (HRW, 2005). The Public Defender's Office chooses members of the council from the body of local NGOs that work on torture. Other achievements include, "the automatic investigation of reports of injuries of a prisoner when transferred from the custody of the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice and the strengthening of internal monitoring within the Office of the Procurator General" (HRW, 2005, p. 7). According to the same report, "by January, the newly created torture prevention monitoring council appeared to be working effectively, but their monitoring efforts had yet to reduce reports of abuse" (HRW, 2005, p. 7). Despite this sporadic breakthroughs, it can be noted that overall, "impediments to accountability appeared to remain institutionalized, with law enforcement bodies systematically finding ways to avoid having to take criminal responsibility for acts of torture and ill-treatment" (HRW, 2005, p.7).

4.2.2. Holding private corporations accountable. So far, Georgian CSOs have not been particularly active in holding specific corporations accountable. The most important exception is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) project, implemented by the British Petroleum Corporation. It frequently comes under scrutiny by both Georgian and international CSOs. The effectiveness of these activities is, however, rather limited. In 2003, the media and environmental NGOs were unable to galvanize and use public opinion against changing the route the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Despite public protests, the pipeline was routed through the Borjomi national park (NGOSI, 2003).

General weakness of trade unions may be an obvious indicator of the failure of Georgian civil society to enforce corporate responsibility. Moreover, some initiatives to establish trade unions within private corporations backfired. For example, attempts to create a union in Kazbegi, the leading Georgian beer-producing company, led to the initiators losing their jobs.

In 2004, a number of the Georgian business organisations adopted the Business Code of Conduct aimed at increasing corporate accountability. This was accomplished mainly at the initiative of CSOs (MARNET Conference, 2005). However, it is still too early to evaluate the results of this initiative.

Whereas the SAG felt that there are some CSO attempts to hold corporate business accountable, it concluded that, nevertheless, civil society's activity in this area lacks discernible impact.

4.3. Responding to social interests

This subdimension analyses the extent to which Georgia's civil society actors are responsive to social interests. Table III.4.4 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.4: Indicators assessing responding to social interests

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.3.1	Responsiveness	<u>2</u>
4.3.2	Public trust in CSOs	<u>1</u>

4.3.1. Responsiveness. Georgian civil society responds to social issues, but the effect and visibility of their activities in this area are limited. One reason for this may be that the priorities of most developed and publicly known NGOs rest in different spheres, such as the development of democratic institutions and human rights, in particular minority rights. However, there are also a number of organisations that are focused on environment issues, poverty reduction and the problem of children, the disabled and senior citizens.


There may also be a discrepancy between the NGO agenda and the social problems which are considered most pressing by society at large. According to a sociological study of attitudes of the population, teachers and entrepreneurs towards NGOs, carried out by the Tbilisi State University, people mostly expect from NGOs addressing the problem of corruption (Kachkachishvili, J., 2002). They also gave priority to children's problems and environmental issues. The same respondents considered that NGOs protected ethnic minority rights effectively enough, and paid too much attention to the rights of religious minorities.

The political opposition parties are mostly taking up concerns that are widely shared, such as problems of pensioners and the unemployed. Their agendas are thus closer to the social concerns of society at large, than the agenda of NGOs, which pays greater attention to minority rights. This was reflected in the USAID country reports stating that NGOs tend to legitimize their involvement in public decision-making based on their expertise and connections, rather than on their representation of the public interest (NGOSI, 2003).

Considering political parties as members of civil society and their activism to deal with the pressing social problems of unemployment through a large number of initiatives concerning labour rights, the SAG assigned a rather high score to this indicator.


4.3.2. Public Trust. The attitude of the Georgian population towards the non-governmental sector is ambivalent, though a large part looks at the NGO sector favourably.

Figure III.4.3 reports the results of a sociological study that describes how the general population, entrepreneurs and teachers (including university professors) assess the activities of NGOs (Kachkachishvili, J., 2002):

FIGURE III.4.3: Public perception of Georgian NGOs activities

The chart shows that while strongly positive evaluations of NGO activities are few, most people nonetheless assess them more positively than negatively. Those respondents, who have cooperated with NGOs, generally have a more positive assessment of the third sector activities.

The respondents' perception of corruption in different institutions is critical for her or his attitudes towards NGOs. As the figure below shows, in this regard the perception of CSOs is more favourable than that of state institutions. It also shows that people trust mass media more than NGOs, which is likely to be due to the fact that the media is perceived to have no access to public or philanthropic funds and thus no opportunity to misuse them.

FIGURE III.4.4: Public perception of corruption of various institutions

4.4. Empowering citizens

This subdimension describes and assesses the extent to which Georgian civil society is active and successful in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalized groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives. Table III.4.5 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.5: Indicators assessing Empowering citizens

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.4.1	Informing/educating citizens	<u>2</u>
4.4.2	Building capacity for collective action and resolving joint problems	<u>1</u>
4.4.3	Empowering marginalized people	<u>1</u>
4.4.4	Empowering women	<u>2</u>
4.4.5	Building social capital	<u>2</u>
4.4.6	Supporting/creating livelihoods	<u>1</u>

4.4.1. *Informing/educating citizens.* Civic education is a very important field of engagement for the country's civil society. However, overall impact is limited.

According to the Countrywide Assessment of Georgian CSOs (CSR DG & UNAG, 2005), 76.2% of 189 organisations included in the study held trainings and seminars, and 57.7% of them issue publications. Twenty-one organisations were working in civic education (11.2%) and 36 (19.1%) worked on education in general. A large number of CSO projects include civic education component.

No relevant data is available on how effective CSOs have been in public information and education, and whether their activities resulted in a measurable impact. Some experts believe

that the Rose Revolution demonstrated that a critical mass of the Georgian people have internalized democratic values, and that civil society, as the most vocal and consistent champions of liberal and democratic values during this period played a crucial role, particularly through their education efforts. Civil society activists have been quite active in talking to the media as leading independent commentators on public policy causes, especially those related to democracy development and human rights. However, in the last two years civil society representatives have been comparatively less visible than before.

4.4.2. Building capacity for collective action. Georgian CSOs work to build people's capacity of self-organisation. However, the results so far have been less than impressive, and there are no measurable indicators showing that communities with which CSOs work display greater capacity for organizing themselves after the CSOs leave.

Georgian organisations give less priority to this kind of work: only nine organisations (4.8%) of 189 surveyed by the Countrywide Assessment of Georgian CSOs, said they worked primarily in community mobilization (DEVDARIANI, J., 2003).

The Georgian society has demonstrated capacity for peaceful and fairly organised protest actions, which culminated in the Rose Revolution of November 2003. Many experts believe that NGOs, like the Liberty Institute and Kmaral! (Enough) have been important for high level of self-organisation for democratic causes. However, the level of mobilization for protest actions depends on a cause: the same CSOs that were active during the Rose Revolution have not been successful in mobilizing protest against religiously motivated violence in 1999 to 2002. In 2003, despite wide media coverage and significant ecological and equity concerns, environmental NGOs were unable to galvanize public opinion against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (NGOSI, 2003).

When it comes to mobilizing citizens for positive actions, such as drawing resources to solve common problems of the community, the results have been less impressive. There were several large programmes aimed at enhancing capacity for collective action on a local community level, which were mainly led by international NGOs. This includes the West Georgia Community Mobilization Initiative (West GCMI), an \$11.5 million project funded by USAID and implemented by CARE, which sought to enhance the capacity of vulnerable communities to address their own needs and attain self-reliance, mainly through a combination of community mobilization and micro-project implementation (Bruckner, T., 2004). A similar programme, called East Georgia Community Mobilization Initiative, was implemented by Mercy Corps. However, the challenge for the programme was to increase the political agency of citizens in the context of a weak and corrupt government and a poor enabling environment which resulted in doubts about whether the empowerment impacts achieved so far could be sustained in the long term (Tilstone, V., 2003). Therefore, while a number of useful projects were implemented among local communities, the long term effect on the local capacity for community mobilization remains to be seen.

4.4.3 Empowering marginalized people. There are a number of groups that can be considered marginalized in Georgia: senior citizens that live alone, orphans and street children, the disabled people, IDPs and refugees, homosexuals, people infected by HIV/AIDS, mentally ill.

Georgian CSOs deliver numerous activities aimed at empowering marginalized population. However, both the scope and impact of these activities are rather limited.

For instance, in 2003-2004, the organisation, Child and Environment, implemented a project aimed at education, rehabilitation and reintegration of street children and unprotected children deprived of parental care, through mobile service delivery and the operation of children day care centre for working parents. The same organisation carried out another project in the capital during the same period, which aimed at the psycho-pedagogical rehabilitation and social adaptation of the mentally handicapped children from early ages with mild and moderate retardation through the provision of an integrated education programme and the implementation of inclusive teaching in kindergartens and schools (Assistance Georgia, 2005). Another project, Entrepreneurial Training for Disadvantaged Youth, is being carried out by YEDI, in partnership with SOS Children's Village, Child and Environment, and CBC (Assistance Georgia, 2005). So far no direct research has been carried out to measure the real impact these and other CSO programmes had on the target groups.

4.4.4. Empowering women. There is a developed network of organisations that work on gender issues. However, this dimension of civil society activism is out of the mainstream, as most of the Georgian society does not perceive gender equality as a priority problem for the country. It is widely believed that women rights are fairly well protected in Georgia and while there may be problems in these areas, they are less pressing ones than other political and economic problems.

According to the Countrywide Assessment of Georgian CSOs, 22 of the 189 CSOs surveyed said their primary focus of work was women's issues (CSRDG & UNAG, 2005). There are several coalitions of women organisations. However, most are located in Tbilisi, and the level of cooperation between them and NGOs working in the regions is not sufficiently developed.

Women's organisations work on areas such as women empowerment, educating women leaders, issues of trafficking, domestic violence, reproductive and sexual health and community participation. One discernible impact of this work is that gender issues have been much wider discussed in the Georgian society, and values of gender equality are more widely promoted. CSOs themselves are more sensitized towards importance of women issues than other segments of society. For example, the New Citizen Advocacy Program requires grantees to be sensitive to gender issues. However, most NGOs give little importance to gender issues in their work or only pay lip service to the issue. They do not equitably represent women's issues and may not recognise the basic assistance required by start-up informal groups (WID, 2003).

Trafficking is emerging as one of the gravest problems among gender-related issues. Several NGOs provide assistance to victims of trafficking. The government supports their efforts to conduct training on problems of trafficking for police in different regions of Georgia and maintain an OSCE-funded working group with the NGO community to draft the new Plan of Action and additional legislation including protections for victims' rights (CRHRP, 2004).

4.4.5. Building social capital. A large group of Georgian CSOs share common values and agendas of change, and act as a network. On this basis, civil society has developed a reasonable level of trust among its members. After the Rose Revolution, CSOs displayed greater differences with regard to important political and public issues. Despite certain conflicts and disagreements, the level of trust within civil society remains high enough to enable dialogue and fruitful cooperation. However, CSOs are less successful in spreading this social capital to wider society. Georgian civil society does not resemble the classical pattern, in that it is not an arena where various, often conflicting societal interests come together to interact with one another and influence government policies. It is rather a unified social strata which shares common values

and strives to transform Georgia into a western type liberal democracy (Nodia, G., 2005b). It is also widely agreed that the strength of Georgian civil society rests mainly on “the nucleus of CSOs” while other actors of civil society are relatively weakly developed (Nodia, G., 2005, p.42).

Members of this core group of established CSOs, which function mainly on western donors funding, belong to a new social strata of young professionals, who are proficient in English, have computer skills, higher levels of education and often western educated or trained. They are also pro-western, competitive people (Muskhelishvili, M., 2005, p. 30). It can be presumed with a certain amount of confidence that they genuinely share the values of liberal democracy, including trust, tolerance and public spiritedness. They also enjoy a certain amount of influence on the wider public and on the political class, solely because the project of transforming Georgia into liberal democracy is widely accepted and agreed upon and almost “nobody contests it openly” (Nodia, G., 2005b, p. 43).

4.4.6 Supporting livelihoods. A number of income generating projects are implemented by Georgian CSOs and they are widely supported by foreign donor organisations. However, there is no discernible impact on wider society.

Several international and local organisations were carrying out income generation projects in Georgia during 2004 and 2005. These were Care Caucasus, CHCA, Eurasia Foundation, Mercy Corps, UMCOR, World Vision and YEDI (Assistance Georgia 2005).

From 1 April 2003 to 30 April 2004 CHCA carried out its Income Generation Program (IGP) targeted at income problems of vulnerable IDP households. CHCA provided income generation opportunities to vulnerable IDPs, who are unable to start their own business, by giving them access to the micro business start up funds (Assistance Georgia, 2005). Care Caucasus, in partnership with Agrisystems, Constanta and Akhaltsikhe Business Centre, carried out the Sustainable Livelihoods in Adigeni and Adjacent Rayons (SLAAR) project in Samtskhe-Javakheti. The goal of SLAAR was to achieve sustainable improvements in the livelihoods of rural people and reduce poverty in the highland areas of Georgia. The project’s purpose was to improve access to resources, skills and markets for farmers, small rural businesses and community groups in Adigeni and adjacent districts. Mercy Corps, together with four Georgian NGOs (Elkana, Constanta Foundation, Curatio International Foundation and Technical Assistance in Georgia), is carrying out Community Investment Project - East (CIP-E). The project promotes sustainable social, economic and environmental development for the communities along the BTC and SCP oil pipeline route (Assistance Georgia, 2005). It involves civic groups, government and the private sector, and it emphasizes the vital leadership role that local communities must play. It also encourages communities to implement communal infrastructure projects to improve the daily lives of the residents, extending to income generation, agriculture and health benefits (Georgia overview, 2005). No reliable data exist, however, concerning the real impact of these income generating activities. In this context, it is interesting to note that, despite overall economic growth, the level of unemployment in Georgia is not falling.

The SAG assigned a rather low score based on argument that as yet Georgian CSOs activities have not resulted in increased employment or any increase in poor people’s income.

4.5. Meeting societal needs

This subdimension examines the extent to which Georgian civil society is active and successful in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalized groups. Table III.4.6 summarises the respective indicator scores.

Table III.4.6: Indicators assessing meeting societal needs

Ref. #	Indicators	Score
4.5.1	Lobbying for state service provision	1
4.5.2	Meeting societal needs directly	1
4.5.3	Meeting the needs of marginalized groups	2


4.5.1. Lobbying for state service provision. There are some examples of CSOs successfully lobbying the government to meet social needs. For instance, CSOs advocating for the rights of disabled people succeeded in June 2005 to establish a telephone tariff benefit for blind people. In 2005, the schoolteachers' trade unions successfully pressured the ministry of education and science to enhance minimal threshold of schoolteachers' wages to the level of living wage, since previously wages were below minimum wage. However, such successes are rather sporadic and they do not constitute a common trend.

As already discussed under indicator 4.3.1, the general public expects civil society to be more active and effective through successfully lobbying the government to meet societal concern in such areas as fighting corruption, defending children rights and resolving environmental problems (Kachachishvili, J., 2002). However, while assigning a score, the SAG members considered that civil society's lobbying did not lead to any serious and visible governmental steps aimed at addressing the mentioned pressing societal needs.

4.5.2. Meeting pressing societal needs directly. Despite some progress in efforts by Georgian CSOs to meet societal needs directly, such activities are less developed than most other areas of CSOs' work.

The USAID NGO sustainability index's²⁸ service provision indicator deteriorated in 2003 but has again made some progress the next year (2004).

²⁸ score 1 shows highest result while score 7 shows the lowest

FIGURE III.4.5: Service Provision (NGOSI, 2004)

In fields like human rights, HIV/AIDS, humanitarian assistance, training and agriculture there are well-known service provider NGOs. However, whereas all of their services are needed, they are not necessarily the result of a need assessment of the priorities of their constituencies (NGOSI, 2004).

According to the Countrywide Assessment of Georgian CSOs (CSR DG & UNAG, 2005) service delivery CSOs priorities are as shown in the table below:

The table shows that **Table III.4.7: Service delivery CSOs priority areas**

only few CSOs have priorities, which could be attributed strictly to areas of pressing societal needs – such as addressing socially vulnerable groups, children, or disability issues.

Priority	Number (189 surveyed CSOs)	Percent
Education	36	(19.1%)
women issues	22	(11.7%)
civic education	21	(11.2%)
Healthcare	19	(10.1%)
socially vulnerable groups	17	(9.0%)
psychological rehabilitation	10	(5.3%)
youth issues	12	(6.4%)
economic development	12	(6.4%)
small business development	11	(5.9%)

The table below shows data from the same study on the main types of services.

Here again there are few CSOs, whose types of services meet societal needs directly – such as humanitarian assistance, assistance in courts and psychological rehabilitation.

4.5.3. Meeting needs of marginalized groups. A number of Georgian CSOs provide services to marginalized groups and their efforts are somewhat more effective than those of the government.

Table III.4.8. Types of CSOs services

Types of services	Percentage of CSOs
Trainings/seminars	76.2%
Consultations	73.0%
Legislative work/lobbying	35.4%
Humanitarian assistance	24.3%
Assistance in courts	20.6%
Psychological rehabilitation	14.8%

The Government admits that many services provided by NGOs are of higher quality and more accessible than those provided by the government. However, state grants are not readily available for NGOs, even after the Rose Revolution (NGOSI, 2004).

On the other hand, Georgian tax legislation hinders cost-recovery economic activity by treating all NGO income from paid services as taxable profit. Therefore, most NGOs offer only free services. In some cases, this may discourage them from improving the quality, efficiency and scale of their services. However, in some cases free service is envisaged at the target group benefit. The Young Lawyers Association, for example, does not charge its customers since they are generally unable to pay (NGOSI, 2003).

Despite this, there are successful services. Many NGOs maintain community-based services for the most vulnerable groups, such as vocational training for the disabled, home care for the elderly or integrated centres for disadvantaged children, which constitute an important part of the social safety net that mitigates these people's harsh circumstances. Such services continue to require external assistance to address issues of quality, sustainability and broader public support (NGOSI, 2003).

Conclusion

Civil society's impact on society and governance can be assessed as limited, though it is far from non-existent. The CSI-SAT has shown that Georgian civil society is more successful in influencing society indirectly, through holding the government accountable or empowering citizens, than through its direct attempts of meeting societal needs or influencing public policy.

The civil society's impact correlates strongly with its own priorities. The most active and motivated organisations work in the area of supporting democracy, human rights and rule of law. Here civil society has much greater influence than in other spheres. The most direct way of exerting impact is through NGO professionals 'migrating' to government, which was common in the months following the Rose Revolution. However, civil society continues to be influential in direct and indirect ways, through supplying the government with ideas, or by criticizing certain activities of the government. However, after a number of CSO leaders moved into government positions, the overall capacity of the remaining organisations, and the willingness of the government to cooperate with them, declined, which explains the low score with regards to influencing public policy.

When trying to empower citizens, Georgian CSOs are more successful in civic education, empowering women and building social capital than in building capacity for collective action, empowering marginalized people and creating livelihoods. However, CSOs have been successful in raising awareness on human rights and teaching people how to protect these

rights. The experience of the Rose Revolution, when the issue of electoral fraud led to a high level of civic mobilization, is the most obvious indication of civil society's role in defending and promoting human rights


It is notable that the priorities of the core group of the most active and well-developed CSOs diverge from those of the wider public, which would like CSOs to tackle social and economic problems linked more directly to poverty. One could say that the most active CSOs represent the liberal agenda of democracy, human rights and minority protection, rather than articulate and defend prevailing social interests. Therefore, public attitudes towards civil society are rather ambivalent. Part of the public appreciates civil society's efforts to defend the liberal agenda, while others disapprove and even consider CSOs' activities detrimental to Georgia's national interest and identity.

IV CONCLUSION

The conclusion seeks to draw together the main findings and recommendations of the CSI-SAT project in Georgia. It offers a thorough interpretation of the state of Georgia's civil society as depicted in the Civil Society Diamond and then engages with some of key findings resulting from the CSI-SAT project in Georgia.

The diagram visualising the state of Georgia's civil society in form of a diamond is somewhat unbalanced in its four dimensions, civil society's structure, environment, values and impact. While the strongest dimension of Georgian civil society is its values (1.7), its external environment (1.4) constitutes the weakest dimension. The remaining two dimensions, Impact and Structure, each scored a 1.4.

FIGURE IV.1: Civil Society Diamond for Georgia



This discrepancy in the scores of the four dimensions leads to the obvious recommendation that Georgian civil society should capitalize on the strength of its values in order to strengthen its structure, make its work more effective and ultimately to improve its external environment. At the same time, it is important to take a closer look as to how Georgian civil society should develop in each of these dimensions. This closer look is presented below through an examination of the most

prominent weaknesses and strengths of these dimensions.

Within the structure dimension, inter-relations among civil society actors (2.0) constitute the strongest subdimension. Georgian civil society, at least its most developed core, has demonstrated a good level of inter-sectoral communication and cooperation. However, this strongly contrasts with the very low extent of citizen participation (0.5). Only a small minority of people are members of CSOs, donate to charity, or undertake voluntary work on a regular basis. Mobilizing citizens and involving them in civil society activities should therefore guide civil society's strategy regarding the strengthening its structural foundations.

While Georgian civil society is a rather tight network built around commitment to certain values, such as human rights, non-violence and tolerance, it is much weaker in its commitments to social protection and poverty eradication. These findings appear to be somewhat illogical in a country where a large part of the population lives below the poverty line and where issues such as unemployment, low income and deterioration of social services top the list of citizen's concerns. Thus, there is an obvious mismatch between the agenda of the most active and committed part of the civil society, and citizen's concerns. This mismatch may be one explanation for the insufficient involvement of citizen's in civil society.

Therefore, Georgian civil society needs to address and eventually overcome the “agenda gap” between its own agenda and the one of the wider public

As far as the impact dimension is concerned, civil society shows a weak capacity to meet societal needs (1.3) and influence public policy (1.3). With regards to the latter, the low impact is due to the fact that civil society itself does not prioritize poverty eradication in its activities. However, it may be paradoxical that after having played an important role in the Rose Revolution and giving a large share of its human capital to the government, civil society does not have more significant impact on public policies. The reason behind this weakness brings us to the dimension that the CSI-SAT study found to be the weakest dimension, the Environment dimension.

Within the environment dimension, the research showed that problems around basic freedoms, the general political and socio-cultural context, as well as poor relations with the private sector make the environment not conducive to civil society’s development. State-civil society relations were evaluated as much stronger. However, this is more a consequence of the State accepting the autonomy of civil society, rather than of its willingness to cooperate with it.

Based on the key findings in the structure dimension regarding limited citizen participation and relatively developed inter-sectoral relations, Georgian civil society can be described as somewhat insulated from society at large. It seems that Georgian civil society feels most comfortable within its own environment. Therefore, while for obvious reasons, it is difficult for civil society to address factors relating to its external environment, CSOs should nonetheless make it their priority to develop greater and more effective relationships with both the wider public and the government. The above-mentioned recommendation, i.e. to focus on increasing of the level of citizens’ participation in civil society activities, appears to be the most obvious way to achieve progress in this regard.

NEXT STEPS

CTC is planning on publicising the findings of this study as widely as possible, to popularise this publication not only among CSOs, but also State and business actors as well. This report will be published in two languages, Georgian and English, and should serve as a useful reference for students interested in civil society issues. CTC will also initiate meetings with members of the SAG and other parties, who are interested in being involved in further activities building on the findings of the CSI project. Moreover, CTC plans to use the CSI as the tool for its own research and information unit, which aims to monitor the development of Georgian society.

In its English version, this publication will also serve as the basis for international comparisons within the framework of the Civil Society Index project as a whole. International comparison is the task of CIVICUS, which will publish a comprehensive report in 2006. In June 2006, a global CSI workshop is planned to convene all of the national teams that have participated in the project, as well as external project partners. CIVICUS will then evaluate and refine the methodology employed, on the basis of current experience and findings, and plans to repeat the study in the future.

CTC implemented the Civil Society Index Short Assessment Tool in this phase of the project. The CSI-SAT is intended to serve as an excellent basis for a full CSI implementation, using a

more participatory and comprehensive approach in 2007. CTC certainly intends to make regular use of the CSI as a tracking tool for the development of civil society in Georgia.

LIST OF APPENDICES**Appendix 1: List of SAG Members****Appendix 2: CSI Scoring Matrix**

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF SAG MEMBERS

1. Zaur Khalilov of Civil Integration Foundation
2. Nana Kakabadze of Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights
3. Manana Ghurchumelidze of Georgian Teachers' Independent Trade Union "Solidaroba"
4. Lela Kartvelishvili of Evangelist-Baptist church
5. Levan Kharatishvili of Civil Initiatives' Centre
6. Manana Javakhishvili of Dynamic Psychology for Development and Democracy
7. Lela Khomeriki of International Centre for Civil Culture
8. Bela Tsipuria - deputy Minister of Education and Science
9. Ia Tikanadze of Friedrich Ebert Foundation
10. Nino Durglishvili of Tbilisi State University
11. Eka Kvesitadze of daily newspaper – "24 Hours"

APPENDIX 2 - THE CSI SCORING MATRIX

1 – STRUCTURE

1.1 - Breadth of citizen participation

Description: How widespread is citizen involvement in civil society? What proportion of citizens engages in civil society activities?

1.1.1 - Non-partisan political action

Description: What percentage of people have ever undertaken any form of non-partisan political action (e.g. written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, attended a demonstration)?

A very small minority (less than 10%).	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.2 - Charitable giving

Description: What percentage of people donate to charity on a regular basis?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A significant proportion (31% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of people belong to at least one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.1.4 - Volunteering

Description: What percentage of people undertake volunteer work on a regular basis (at least once a year)?

A very small minority (less than 10%)	Score 0
A small minority (10% to 30%)	Score 1
A minority (31% to 50%)	Score 2
A majority (more than 50%)	Score 3

1.1.5 - Collective community action

Description: What percentage of people have participated in a collective community action within the last year (e.g. attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or a collective effort to solve a community problem)?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% -50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.2 - Depth of citizen participation

***Description:* How deep/meaningful is citizen participation in civil society? How frequently/extensively do people engage in civil society activities?**

1.2.1 - Charitable giving

Description: How much (i.e. what percentage of personal income) do people who give to charity on a regular basis donate, on average, per year?

Less than 1%	Score 0
1% to 2%	Score 1
2.1% to 3%	Score 2
More than 3%	Score 3

1.2.2 - Volunteering

Description: How many hours per month, on average, do volunteers devote to volunteer work?

Less than 2 hours	Score 0
2 to 5 hours	Score 1
5.1 to 8 hours	Score 2
More than 8 hours.	Score 3

1.2.3 - CSO membership

Description: What percentage of CSO members belong to more than one CSO?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

1.3 - Diversity of civil society participants

***Description:* How diverse/representative is the civil society arena? Do all social groups participate equitably in civil society? Are any groups dominant or excluded?**

1.3.1 - CSO membership

Description: To what extent do CSOs represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSOs.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSOs.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSOs.	Score 2
CSOs equitably represent all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.2 - CSO leadership

Description: To what extent is there diversity in CSO leadership? To what extent does CSO leadership represent all significant social groups (e.g. women, rural dwellers, poor people and minorities)?

Significant social groups are absent / excluded from CSO leadership roles.	Score 0
Significant social groups are largely absent from CSO leadership roles.	Score 1
Significant social groups are under-represented in CSO leadership roles.	Score 2
CSO leadership equitably represents all social groups. No group is noticeably under-represented.	Score 3

1.3.3 Distribution of CSOs

Description: How are CSOs distributed throughout the country?

CSOs are highly concentrated in the major urban centres.	Score 0
CSOs are largely concentrated in urban areas.	Score 1
CSOs are present in all but the most remote areas of the country.	Score 2
CSOs are present in all areas of the country.	Score 3

1.4. - Level of organisation

***Description:* How well-organised is civil society? What kind of infrastructure exists for civil society?**

1.4.1 - Existence of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: What percentage of CSOs belong to a federation or umbrella body of related organisations?

A small minority (less than 30%)	Score 0
A minority (30% to 50%)	Score 1
A majority (51% to 70%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 70%)	Score 3

1.4.2 - Effectiveness of CSO umbrella bodies

Description: How effective do CSO stakeholders judge existing federations or umbrella bodies to be in achieving their defined goals?

Completely ineffective (or non-existent)	Score 0
Largely ineffective	Score 1
Somewhat effective	Score 2
Effective	Score 3

1.4.3 - Self-regulation

Description: Are there efforts among CSOs to self-regulate? How effective and enforceable are existing self-regulatory mechanisms? What percentage of CSOs abide by a collective code of conduct (or some other form of self-regulation)?

There are no efforts among CSOs to self-regulate.	Score 0
Preliminary efforts have been to self-regulate but only a small minority of CSOs are involved and impact is extremely limited.	Score 1
Some mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place but only some sectors of CSOs are involved and there is no effective method of enforcement. As a result, impact is limited.	Score 2
Mechanisms for CSO self-regulation are in place and function quite effectively. A discernible impact on CSO behaviour can be detected.	Score 3

1.4.4 - Support infrastructure

Description: What is the level of support infrastructure for civil society? How many civil society support organisations exist in the country? Are they effective?

There is no support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 0
There is very limited infrastructure for civil society.	Score 1
Support infrastructure exists for some sectors of civil society and is expanding.	Score 2
There is a well-developed support infrastructure for civil society.	Score 3

1.4.5 - International linkages

Description: What proportion of CSOs have international linkages (e.g. are members of international networks, participate in global events)?

Only a handful of "elite" CSOs have international linkages.	Score 0
A limited number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 1
A moderate number of (mainly national-level) CSOs have international linkages.	Score 2
A significant number of CSOs from different sectors and different levels (grassroots to national) have international linkages.	Score 3

1.5 - Inter-relations

***Description:* How strong / productive are relations among civil society actors?**

1.5.1 - Communication

Description: What is the extent of communication between civil society actors?

Very little	Score 0
Limited	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Significant	Score 3

1.5.2 - Cooperation

Description: How much do civil society actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern? Can examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions (around a specific issue or common concern) be identified?

CS actors do not cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. No examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances/coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 0
It is very rare that CS actors cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Very few	Score 1

examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	
CS actors on occasion cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Some examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 2
CS actors regularly cooperate with each other on issues of common concern. Numerous examples of cross-sectoral CSO alliances / coalitions can be identified / detected.	Score 3

1.6 – Resources

Description: To what extent do CSOs have adequate resources to achieve their goals?

1.6.1 - Financial resources

Description: How adequate is the level of financial resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious financial resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate financial resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the financial resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure financial resource base.	Score 3

1.6.2 - Human resources

Description: How adequate is the level of human resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious human resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate human resources to achieve their goal.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the human resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure human resource base.	Score 3

1.6.3 - Technological and infrastructural resources

Description: How adequate is the level of technological and infrastructural resources for CSOs?

On average, CSOs suffer from a serious technological and infrastructural resource problem.	Score 0
On average, CSOs have inadequate technological and infrastructural resources to achieve their goals.	Score 1
On average, CSOs have most of the technological and infrastructural resources they require to achieve their defined goals.	Score 2
On average, CSOs have an adequate and secure technological and infrastructural resource base.	Score 3

2 - ENVIRONMENT²⁹

2.1 - Political context

Description: What is the political situation in the country and its impact on civil society?

2.1.1 - Political rights

Description: How strong are the restrictions on citizens' political rights (e.g. to participate freely in political processes, elect political leaders through free and fair elections, freely organise in political parties)?

There are severe restrictions on the political rights of citizens. Citizens cannot participate in political processes.	Score 0
There are some restrictions on the political rights of citizens and their participation in political processes.	Score 1
Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens' political rights and their participation in political processes.	Score 2
People have the full freedom and choice to exercise their political rights and meaningfully participate in political processes.	Score 3

2.1.2 - Political competition

Description: What are the main characteristics of the party system in terms of number of parties, ideological spectrum, institutionalisation and party competition?

Single party system.	Score 0
Small number of parties based on personalism, clientelism or appealing to identity politics.	Score 1
Multiple parties, but weakly institutionalised and / or lacking ideological distinction.	Score 2
Robust, multi-party competition, with well-institutionalised and ideologically diverse parties.	Score 3

²⁹ For most of the indicators, secondary data sources are available for a broad range of countries. For each indicator, the scores indicate how to translate the original secondary data into the 4-point scale of the CSI scoring matrix.

2.1.3 - Rule of law

Description: To what extent is the rule of law entrenched in the country?

There is general disregard for the law by citizens and the state.	Score 0
There is low confidence in and frequent violations of the law by citizens and the state.	Score 1
There is a moderate level of confidence in the law. Violations of the law by citizens and the state are not uncommon.	Score 2
Society is governed by fair and predictable rules, which are generally abided by.	Score 3

2.1.4 – Corruption

Description: What is the level of perceived corruption in the public sector?

High	Score 0
Substantial	Score 1
Moderate	Score 2
Low	Score 3

2.1.5 – State effectiveness

Description: To what extent is the state able to fulfil its defined functions?

The state bureaucracy has collapsed or is entirely ineffective (e.g. due to political, economic or social crisis).	Score 0
The capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited.	Score 1
State bureaucracy is functional but perceived as incompetent and / or non-responsive.	Score 2
State bureaucracy is fully functional and perceived to work in the public's interests.	Score 3

2.1.6 – Decentralisation

Description: To what extent is government expenditure devolved to sub-national authorities?

Sub-national share of government expenditure is less than 20.0%.	Score 0
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 20.0% and 34.9%.	Score 1
Sub-national share of government expenditure is between 35.0% than 49.9%.	Score 2
Sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9%.	Score 3

2.2 - Basic freedoms and rights

***Description:* To what extent are basic freedoms ensured by law and in practice?**

2.2.1 - Civil liberties

Description: To what extent are civil liberties (e.g. freedom of expression, association, assembly) ensured by law and in practice?

Civil liberties are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of civil liberties.	Score 1
There are isolated or occasional violations of civil liberties.	Score 2
Civil liberties are fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.2.2 - Information rights

Description: To what extent is public access to information guaranteed by law? How accessible are government documents to the public?

No laws guarantee information rights. Citizen access to government documents is extremely limited.	Score 0
Citizen access to government documents is limited but expanding.	Score 1
Legislation regarding public access to information is in place, but in practice, it is difficult to obtain government documents.	Score 2
Government documents are broadly and easily accessible to the public.	Score 3

2.2.3 - Press freedoms

Description: To what extent are press freedoms ensured by law and in practice?

Press freedoms are systematically violated.	Score 0
There are frequent violations of press freedoms.	Score 1
There are isolated violations of press freedoms.	Score 2
Freedom of the press is fully ensured by law and in practice.	Score 3

2.3 - Socio-economic context³⁰

***Description:* What is the socio-economic situation in the country and its impact on civil society?**

2.3.1 - Socio-economic context

Description: How much do socio-economic conditions in the country represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society?

Social and economic conditions represent a serious barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. More than five of the following conditions are present: 1. Widespread poverty (e.g. more than 40% of people live on \$2 per day) 2. Civil war (armed conflict in last 5 years) 3. Severe ethnic and/or religious conflict 4. Severe economic crisis (e.g. external debt is more than GNP) 5. Severe social crisis (over last 2 years) 6. Severe socio-economic inequities (Gini coefficient > 0.4) 7. Pervasive adult illiteracy (over 40%) 8. Lack of IT infrastructure (i.e. less than 5 hosts per 10.000 inhabitants)	Score 0
Social and economic conditions significantly limit the effective functioning of civil society. Three, four or five of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 1
Social and economic conditions somewhat limit the effective functioning of civil society. One or two of the conditions indicated are present.	Score 2
Social and economic conditions do not represent a barrier to the effective functioning of civil society. None of the conditions indicated is present.	Score 3

2.4 - Socio-cultural context

***Description:* To what extent are socio-cultural norms and attitudes conducive or detrimental to civil society?**

³⁰ This subdimension/indicator is not broken up into individual indicators to facilitate and simplify scoring. The subdimension/indicator consists of 8 socio-economic conditions which are of importance to civil society. The scores for this indicator are designed in such a way that they indicate how many socio-economic obstacles are there for civil society (max: 8; min: 0). The task for the NAG scoring meeting is to simply verify the number of obstacles (as identified by the secondary data) and assign the score accordingly.

2.4.1 - Trust

Description: How much do members of society trust one another?

Relationships among members of society are characterised by mistrust (e.g. less than 10% of people score on the World Value Survey (WVS) trust indicator).	Score 0
There is widespread mistrust among members of society (e.g. 10% to 30% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 1
There is a moderate level of trust among members of society (e.g. 31% to 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 2
There is a high level of trust among members of society (e.g. more than 50% of people score on the WVS trust indicator).	Score 3

2.4.2 - Tolerance

Description: How tolerant are members of society?

Society is characterised by widespread intolerance (e.g. average score on WVS derived tolerance indicator is 3.0 or higher).	Score 0
Society is characterised by a low level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 2.0 and 2.9).	Score 1
Society is characterised by a moderate level of tolerance (e.g. indicator between 1.0 and 1.9).	Score 2
Society is characterised by a high level of tolerance (e.g. indicator less than 1.0).	Score 3

2.4.3 - Public spiritedness³¹

Description: How strong is the sense of public spiritedness among members of society?

Very low level of public spiritedness in society (e.g. average score on WVS derived public spiritedness indicator is more than 3.5).	Score 0
Low level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 2.6 and 3.5).	Score 1
Moderate level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator between 1.5 and 2.5).	Score 2
High level of public spiritedness (e.g. indicator less than 1.5).	Score 3

2.5 - Legal environment

***Description:* To what extent is the existing legal environment enabling or disabling to civil society?**

2.5.1 - CSO registration³²

Description: How supportive is the CSO registration process? Is the process (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) following legal provisions and (5) consistently applied?

The CSO registration process is not supportive at all. Four or five of the quality characteristics are absent.	Score 0
The CSO registration is not very supportive. Two or three quality characteristics are absent.	Score 1
The CSO registration process can be judged as relatively supportive. One quality characteristic is absent.	Score 2
The CSO registration process is supportive. None of the quality characteristics is absent.	Score 3

2.5.2 - Allowable advocacy activities

Description: To what extent are CSOs free to engage in advocacy / criticise government?

CSOs are not allowed to engage in advocacy or criticise the government.	Score 0
There are excessive and / or vaguely defined constraints on advocacy activities.	Score 1
Constraints on CSOs' advocacy activities are minimal and clearly defined, such as prohibitions on political campaigning.	Score 2
CSOs are permitted to freely engage in advocacy and criticism of government.	Score 3

2.5.3 - Tax laws favourable to CSOs

Description: How favourable is the tax system to CSOs? How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that are eligible for tax exemptions, if any? How significant are these exemptions?

The tax system impedes CSOs. No tax exemption or preference of any kind is available for CSOs.	Score 0
--	---------

³¹ The score is derived by averaging the means for the three variables (1. claiming government benefits, 2. avoiding a fare on public transport and 3. cheating on taxes).

³² This indicator combines a number of individual quality characteristics of the registration, namely whether the registration is (1) simple, (2) quick, (3) inexpensive, (4) fairly applied and (5) consistently applied. The process of using these five 'Yes/No' variables for the scoring of the CSO registration indicator by the NAG follows the process outlined for subdimension 3. The indicator scores are defined by how many of these five quality characteristics are existent/absent.

The tax system is burdensome to CSOs. Tax exemptions or preferences are available only for a narrow range of CSOs (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or for limited sources of income (e.g. grants or donations).	Score 1
The tax system contains some incentives favouring CSOs. Only a narrow range of CSOs is excluded from tax exemptions, preferences and/or exemptions, or preferences are available from some taxes and some activities.	Score 2
The tax system provides favourable treatment for CSOs. Exemptions or preferences are available from a range of taxes and for a range of activities, limited only in appropriate circumstances.	Score 3

2.5.4 - Tax benefits for philanthropy

Description: How broadly available are tax deductions or credits, or other tax benefits, to encourage individual and corporate giving?

No tax benefits are available (to individuals or corporations) for charitable giving.	Score 0
Tax benefits are available for a very limited set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 1
Tax benefits are available for a fairly broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 2
Significant tax benefits are available for a broad set of purposes or types of organisations.	Score 3

2.6 - State-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the state?**

2.6.1 – Autonomy

Description: To what extent can civil society exist and function independently of the state? To what extent are CSOs free to operate without excessive government interference? Is government oversight reasonably designed and limited to protect legitimate public interests?

The state controls civil society.	Score 0
CSOs are subject to frequent unwarranted interference in their operations.	Score 1
The state accepts the existence of an independent civil society but CSOs are subject to occasional unwarranted government interference.	Score 2
CSOs operate freely. They are subject only to reasonable oversight linked to clear and legitimate public interests.	Score 3

2.6.2 - Dialogue

Description: To what extent does the state dialogue with civil society? How inclusive and institutionalized are the terms and rules of engagement, if they exist?

There is no meaningful dialogue between civil society and the state.	Score 0
The state only seeks to dialogue with a small sub-set of CSOs on an ad hoc basis.	Score 1
The state dialogues with a relatively broad range of CSOs but on a largely ad hoc basis.	Score 2
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate systematic dialogue between the state and a broad and diverse range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.6.3 - Cooperation / support

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive state resources (in the form of grants, contracts, etc.)?

The level of state resources channelled through CSOs is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives state resources.	Score 2
The state channels significant resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

2.7 - Private sector-civil society relations

***Description:* What is the nature and quality of relations between civil society and the private sector?**

2.7.1 - Private sector attitude

Description: What is the general attitude of the private sector towards civil society actors?

Generally hostile	Score 0
Generally indifferent	Score 1
Generally positive	Score 2
Generally supportive	Score 3

2.7.2 - Corporate social responsibility

Description: How developed are notions and actions of corporate social responsibility?

Major companies show no concern about the social and environmental impacts of their operations.	Score 0
Major companies pay lip service to notions of corporate social responsibility. However, in their operations they frequently disregard negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 1
Major companies are beginning to take the potential negative social and environmental impacts of their operations into account.	Score 2
Major companies take effective measures to protect against negative social and environmental impacts.	Score 3

2.7.3 - Corporate philanthropy³³

Description: How narrow/broad is the range of CSOs that receive support from the private sector?

Corporate philanthropy is insignificant.	Score 0
Only a very limited range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 1
A moderate range of CSOs receives funding from the private sector.	Score 2
The private sector channels resources to a large range of CSOs.	Score 3

3 - VALUES

3.1 – Democracy

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote democracy?**

3.1.1 - Democratic practices within CSOs

Description: To what extent do CSOs practice internal democracy? How much control do members have over decision-making? Are leaders selected through democratic elections?

A large majority (i.e. more than 75%) of CSOs do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little / no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 0
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) do not practice internal democracy (e.g. members have little/no control over decision-making, CSOs are characterised by patronage, nepotism).	Score 1
A majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 50%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (i.e. more than 75%) practice internal democracy (e.g. members have significant control over decision-making; leaders are selected through democratic elections).	Score 3

3.1.2 – Civil society actions to promote democracy

Description: How much does civil society actively promote democracy at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a democratic society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

³³ The NAG's task in scoring the indicator is to assess the significance of corporate support to civil society. Here, the score descriptions focus on two elements: (1) the overall size of corporate support to civil society and (2) the range of CSOs supported by the corporate sector. Both elements are combined in the indicator score descriptions.

3.2 – Transparency

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote transparency?

3.2.1 - Corruption within civil society

Description: How widespread is corruption within CS?

Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very frequent.	Score 0
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are frequent.	Score 1
There are occasional instances of corrupt behaviour within CS.	Score 2
Instances of corrupt behaviour within CS are very rare.	Score 3

3.2.2 - Financial transparency of CSOs

Description: How many CSOs are financially transparent? What percentage of CSOs make their financial accounts publicly available?

A small minority of CSOs (less than 30%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 0
A minority of CSOs (30% -50%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 1
A small majority of CSOs (51% -65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 2
A large majority of CSOs (more than 65%) make their financial accounts publicly available.	Score 3

3.2.3 – Civil society actions to promote transparency

Description: How much does civil society actively promote government and corporate transparency?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in demanding government and corporate transparency. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.3 – Tolerance

Description: To what extent do civil society actors and organisations practice and promote tolerance?

3.3.1 Tolerance within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a tolerant arena?

CS is dominated by intolerant forces. The expression of only a narrow sub-set of views is tolerated.	Score 0
Significant forces within civil society do not tolerate others' views without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
There are some intolerant forces within civil society, but they are isolated from civil society at large.	Score 2
Civil society is an open arena where the expression of <i>all</i> viewpoints is actively encouraged. Intolerant behaviour is strongly denounced by civil society at large.	Score 3

3.3.2 – Civil society actions to promote tolerance

Description: How much does civil society actively promote tolerance at a societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and/or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a tolerant society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.4 - Non-violence

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote non-violence?

3.4.1 - Non-violence within the civil society arena

Description: How widespread is the use of violent means (such as damage to property or personal violence) among civil society actors to express their interests in the public sphere?

Significant mass-based groups within CS use violence as the primary means of expressing their interests.	Score 0
Some isolated groups within CS regularly use violence to express their interests without encountering protest from civil society at large.	Score 1
Some isolated groups within CS occasionally resort to violent actions, but are broadly denounced by CS at large.	Score 2
There is a high level of consensus within CS regarding the principle of non-violence. Acts of violence by CS actors are extremely rare and strongly denounced.	Score 3

3.4.2 – Civil society actions to promote non-violence and peace

Description: How much does civil society actively promote a non-violent society? For example, how much does civil society support the non-violent resolution of social conflicts and peace? Address issues of violence against women, child abuse, violence among youths etc.?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to societal violence.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a non-violent society. CS actions in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility	Score 3

3.5 - Gender equity

***Description:* To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote gender equity?**

3.5.1 - Gender equity within the civil society arena

Description: To what extent is civil society a gender equitable arena?

Women are excluded from civil society leadership roles.	Score 0
Women are largely absent from civil society leadership roles.	Score 1
Women are under-represented in civil society leadership positions.	Score 2
Women are equitably represented as leaders and members of CS.	Score 3

3.5.2 - Gender equitable practices within CSOs

Description: How much do CSOs practice gender equity? What percentage of CSOs with paid employees have policies in place to ensure gender equity?

A small minority (less than 20%)	Score 0
A minority (20%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-65%)	Score 2
A large majority (more than 65%)	Score 3

3.5.3 – Civil society actions to promote gender equity

Description: How much does civil society actively promote gender equity at the societal level?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions actually contribute to gender inequity.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in promoting a gender equitable society. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.6 - Poverty eradication

Description: To what extent do civil society actors promote poverty eradication?

3.6.1 – Civil society actions to eradicate poverty

Description: To what extent does civil society actively seek to eradicate poverty?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to sustain existing economic inequities.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in the struggle to eradicate poverty. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

3.7 - Environmental sustainability

Description: To what extent do civil society actors practice and promote environmental sustainability?

3.7.1 – Civil society actions to sustain the environment

Description: How much does civil society actively seek to sustain the environment?

No active role. No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected. Some CS actions serve to reinforce unsustainable practices.	Score 0
Only a few CS activities in this area can be detected. Their visibility is low and these issues are not attributed much importance by CS as a whole.	Score 1
A number of CS activities in this area can be detected. Broad-based support and / or public visibility of such initiatives, however, are lacking.	Score 2
CS is a driving force in protecting the environment. CS activities in this area enjoy broad-based support and / or strong public visibility.	Score 3

4 - IMPACT

4.1 - Influencing public policy

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

4.1.1 – 4.1.2 - Human Rights and Social Policy Impact Case Studies

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing public policy?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.1.3 - Civil Society's Impact on National Budgeting process Case Study

Description: How active and successful is civil society in influencing the overall national budgeting process?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and focused only on specific budget components. ³⁴	Score 1
Civil society is active in the overall budgeting process, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role in the overall budgeting process. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

³⁴ The term “specific budget component” refers to a single issue or sub-section of the budget, such as the defence budget or welfare grants. Higher scores are assigned for those civil society activities, which provide an analysis, input and advocacy work on the *overall* budget.

4.2 - Holding state and private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding the state and private corporations accountable?

4.2.1 - Holding state accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in monitoring state performance and holding the state accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.2.2 - Holding private corporations accountable

Description: How active and successful is civil society in holding private corporations accountable?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.3 - Responding to social interests

Description: How much are civil society actors responding to social interests?

4.3.1 - Responsiveness

Description: How effectively do civil society actors respond to priority social concerns?

Civil society actors are out of touch with the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 0
There are frequent examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 1
There are isolated examples of crucial social concerns that did not find a voice among existing civil society actors.	Score 2
Civil society actors are very effective in taking up the crucial concerns of the population.	Score 3

4.3.2 - Public Trust

Description: What percentage of the population has trust in civil society actors?

A small minority (< 25%)	Score 0
A large minority (25%-50%)	Score 1
A small majority (51%-75%)	Score 2
A large majority (> 75%)	Score 3

4.4 - Empowering citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering citizens, especially traditionally marginalised groups, to shape decisions that affect their lives?

4.4.1 - Informing/ educating citizens

Description: How active and successful is civil society in informing and educating citizens on public issues?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.2 - Building capacity for collective action

Description: How active and successful is civil society in building the capacity of people to organise themselves, mobilise resources and work together to solve common problems?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.3 - Empowering marginalized people

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering marginalized people?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
---	---------

CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.4 - Empowering women

Description: How active and successful is civil society in empowering women, i.e. to give them real choice and control over their lives?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.4.5 - Building social capital³⁵

Description: To what extent does civil society build social capital among its members? How do levels of trust, tolerance and public spiritedness of members of civil society compare to those of non-members?

Civil society diminishes the stock of social capital in society.	Score 0
Civil society does not contribute to building social capital in society.	Score 1
Civil society does contribute moderately to building social capital in society.	Score 2
Civil Society does contribute strongly to building social capital in society.	Score 3

4.4.6 - Supporting livelihoods

Description: How active and successful is civil society in creating / supporting employment and/or income-generating opportunities (especially for poor people and women)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5 - Meeting societal needs

***Description:* How active and successful is civil society in meeting societal needs, especially those of poor people and other marginalised groups?**

4.5.1 - Lobbying for state service provision

Description: How active and successful is civil society in lobbying the government to meet pressing societal needs?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.2 - Meeting pressing societal needs directly

Description: How active and successful is civil society in directly meeting pressing societal needs (through service delivery or the promotion of self-help initiatives)?

No CS activity of any consequence in this area can be detected.	Score 0
CS activity in this area is very limited and there is no discernible impact.	Score 1
Civil society is active in this area, but impact is limited.	Score 2
Civil society plays an important role. Examples of significant success / impact can be detected.	Score 3

4.5.3 - Meeting needs of marginalised groups

Description: To what extent are CSOs more or less effective than the state in delivering services to marginalised groups?

CSOs are less effective than the state.	Score 0
CSOs are as effective as the state.	Score 1
CSOs are slightly more effective than the state.	Score 2
CSOs are significantly more effective than the state.	Score 3

³⁵ To score this indicator, we make use of the measure of trust (see subdimension socio-cultural norms in Environment dimension): 1) Compute the three measures for two sub-groups of the population: (1) CSO members and (2) non-CSO members and 2) Compare each measure's score for the two sub-groups and establish which sub-group has the better score (i.e. indicating higher trust).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anheier et al. (2004) *Global Civil Society 2004/5* [Internet]. London. Sage, 2004. Available from: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2004/DataProgramme2004.pdf> [Accessed 10 February 2006].

Assistance Georgia (2005) *Assistance Georgia* [Internet]. Tbilisi. Available from: <http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge/> [Accessed 30 June 2005].

Banisar, D. (2004) Freedom of Information and Access to Government Records Around the World. *THE FREEDOMINFO.ORG GLOBAL SURVEY* [Internet] May 12 2004, p.35. Available from: <http://www.freedominfo.org/survey.htm> [Accessed 24 June 2005].

Bruckner, T. (2004) Interview with Charlie Danzoll, Chief of Party, West Georgia Community Mobilization Initiative (West GCMI) project. *Georgia Today Newspaper*, 18 March, pp. 1-4. Available from: <http://www.west-gcmi.care.org.ge/> [Accessed 29 June 2005].

Blank, S. (2004) *Rumsfeld and the Caucasus: America's Deepening Involvement in the South Caucasus Conflicts. Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst* [Internet], September 08. Available from: <http://www.cacianalyst.org/articles.php> [Accessed 3 July 2005]

Budget Monitoring (budget@economists.ge) 12 January 2005. *Electronic Bulletin #33, project "Budget Monitoring"*, Association of Young Economists of Georgia-AYEG. Email to Gurgidze, P. (paata@ctc.org.ge)

Budget Monitoring (budget@economists.ge) 28 April 2005. *Electronic Bulletin #54, project "Budget Monitoring"*, Association of Young Economists of Georgia-AYEG. Email to Gurgidze, P. (paata@ctc.org.ge)

Chatwin, M. E., (2004) Editorial. *Social Policy in Georgia (SPG)* [Internet], Issue #8, pp.1-2. Available from: http://www.horizonti.org/06_Publications/SpigEngN8.pdf [Accessed 29 June 2005].

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2005) *Communication From the Commission to the Council*, European Neighbourhood Policy, Recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and for Egypt and Lebanon [Internet] COM(2005) 72 final. Brussels, 2.3.2005. Available from: http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/country/communication_0503_en.pdf [Accessed 21 June 2005].

CSR DG&UNAG (2005) *Countrywide Assessment of Georgian CSOs*. CAP. Tbilisi, CSR DG&UNAG.

CRHRP (2004) *Georgia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. [Internet], Released February 28, 2005. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour - U.S. Department of State. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41682.htm> [Accessed 25 June 2005]

CSWP-Commission Staff Working Paper (2005) “European Neighbourhood Policy”, *Country Report, Georgia* [Internet], {COM (2005) 72 final} SEC (2005) 288/3. Brussels, Commission of the European Communities. Available from: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/country/georgia_cr_0503.pdf> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

Darchiashvili, D. & Nodia, G. (2003) *Building Democracy in Georgia: Power Structures, The Weak State Syndrome and Corruption in Georgia*. Discussion Paper 5. Armenia, International IDEA, “Printinfo” JV LLC. (Part II, Chapter 4 - Corruption).

Freedom in the World 2004. (2004) *Freedom in the World 2004* [Internet], Country & Territory Reports, Georgia. Available from: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/georgia.htm>> [Accessed 4 June 2005].

Freedom in the World 2005. (2005) *Freedom in the World 2005* [Internet], Table of Independent Countries, Comparative Measures of Freedom. Available from: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf>> [Accessed 4 June 2005]

Freedom House (2005) Freedom House [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>> [Accessed 4 June 2005].

FP-FFREEDOM OF THE PRESS (2005a) *Freedom of the Press* [Internet] Table of Global Press Freedom Rankings. Freedom House. Available from: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

FP-FFREEDOM OF THE PRESS (2005b) *Freedom of the Press* [Internet] Draft Country Reports. Freedom House. Available from: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

Gaprindashvili, Lela (2003) *Women Status in Georgia (in Georgian)*. Tbilisi. Unpublished manuscript.

Gelashvili, N. (2004) *Tolerance in Figures*. Tbilisi, Caucasian House.

Gurgenidze, P. (2002) *Proselytism and its Prohibition*. Tbilisi, CIPDD. Unpublished manuscript.

GRICS (1996-2004) *Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot* [Internet] the World Bank Group. Available from: <<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/>> [Accessed 03 December 2005].

Georgian Laws (2004) *Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression* [Internet] Parliament of Georgia. Available from: <http://parlsrv.parliament.ge/find/gelaw_gems.htm> [Accessed 24 June 2005].

Georgia overview (2005) *Georgia overview* [Internet]. Mercy Corps Website, Caucasus Programs, Georgia. Available from: <<http://www.mercycorps.org/items/510/>> [Accessed 30 June 2005].

Georgian Ministry of Justice (2005) *Unified Register of Unions* [Internet] Available from: <<http://www.justice.gov.ge/kavshirebis%20reestri.html>> [Accessed 28 June 2005].

GDF-Global Development Finance (2005) *Mobilizing Finance and Managing Vulnerability* [Internet], World Bank. Available from: < <http://econ.worldbank.org/> > [Accessed 25 June 2005]

HDI -Human Development Indicators (2003) *Human and income poverty: developing countries* [Internet], UNDP. Available from: <http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_23_1_1.html> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

HDR-Human Development Reports (2004) *Human Development Report 2004* [Internet], UNDP. Available from: <<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2004/>> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

HRW (2005) *Georgia: Uncertain Torture Reform* [Internet], April, Briefing Paper, Country Pages. Georgia, Human Rights Watch. Available from: <<http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/georgia0405/georgia0405.pdf>> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

ICNL- International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (2003) *Analysis of Legislation Affecting Non-entrepreneurial Organizations in Georgia* [Internet], ICNL. Available from: < www.icnl.org > [Accessed 26 June 2005].

International Crisis Group (2004), *Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia*. Europe Report No, 159. Tbilisi/Brussels, International Crisis Group.

Khidasheli, T (2003) *Building Democracy in Georgia: Human Rights in Georgia*. Discussion Paper 6. Armenia, International IDEA, "Printinfo" JV LLC.

Khomeriki, L. (2003) *Building Democracy in Georgia: Human Rights in Georgia, Gender Equality in Post-Soviet Georgia*. Discussion Paper 6. Armenia, International IDEA, "Printinfo" JV LLC

Kachkachishvili, J. (2002) *Sociological Study of Attitudes of Population, Teachers, and Entrepreneurs Towards NGOs*. Tbilisi, Tbilisi State University Department of Sociology, unpublished work.

Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R. (2003) *Peace and Conflict 2003-Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-determination Movements and Democracy* [Internet], University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA, Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). Available from: <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC03print.pdf> > [Accessed 25 June 2005].

Muskhelishvili, M. (2005) *Public Image of the Third Sector*. Discussion Series. Tbilisi, CIPDD.

Mason, W. (2005) Reporter-at-Large: Trouble in Tbilisi. *The National Interest* [Internet] March, Spring 2005 Issue. Available from: <<http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/default.asp>> [accessed 5 June 2005].

MARNET Conference (2005) *MARNET Conference* [Internet] Tbilisi, Business Ethics Association in Georgia. Available from: < <http://www.conference.ge/index.php>> [Accessed 28 June 2005].

Department of Statistics (2006) *Public Finance and Monetary and Credit System* [Internet], Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia. Available from: <http://www.statistics.ge/Main/Yearbook/2005/21Finances_05.doc> [Accessed 03 March 2006].

NIT-Nations in Transit (2005) *Nations in Transit 2005* [Internet] Freedom House. Available from:<<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm>> [Accessed 21 June 2005].

NGOSI (2003) *NGO Sustainability Index: GEORGIA* [Internet], The Office of Democracy, Governance and Social Transition in USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. Available from: <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2003/index.htm> [Accessed 26 June 2005].

NGOSI (2004) *NGO Sustainability Index: GEORGIA* [Internet], The Office of Democracy, Governance and Social Transition in USAID's Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. Available from: <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2004/index.htm> [Accessed 12 December 2005].

Nizharadze, G. (2002) *Research of the problems of multicultural differences and regional unity in the South Caucasus*. Tbilisi, ICCN. Unpublished report.

Nodia, G. (2003) *Building Democracy in Georgia: Developing a Democratic Community in Georgia, Political Parties in Georgia*. Discussion Paper 7. Armenia, International IDEA, "Printinfo" JV LLC.

Nodia, G. (2005) *Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievements and Challenges*. Tbilisi, CIPDD -Caucasus Institute for Peace, Development, and Democracy

Online Magazine - Civil Georgia. (2005) *Online Magazine - Civil Georgia* (OM-CG) [Internet]. Tbilisi, (OM-CG). Available from:< <http://www.civil.ge/>> [Accessed 4 June 2005].

Online Magazine-Civil Georgia. (2004) *Online Magazine - Civil Georgia* [Internet]. Tbilisi, UNA Georgia. Available from:< <http://www.civil.ge/>> [Accessed 4 June 2005].

Oxfam Briefing Paper (2004) *From 'Donorship' to Ownership?* [Internet] Oxfam International. Available from:<[http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we do/issues/democracy_rights/downloads/bp51_prsp.pdf](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/democracy_rights/downloads/bp51_prsp.pdf)> [Accessed 15 December 2005].

Piano, A. (2004) *Countries at the Crossroads: A Survey of Democratic Governance* [Internet] Freedom House. Available from: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm>> [Accessed 23 June 2005].

PACE (2005) *Honoring of obligations and commitments by Georgia* [Internet], Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, resolution 1415. Available from: <<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/T A05/ERES1415.htm>> [Accessed 23 June 2005].

PRSPPR (2005) *Georgia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Progress Report* [Internet] IMF Country Report No. 05/113. Tbilisi, International Monetary Fund. Available from: <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05113.pdf>> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

PSI - Partnership for Social Initiatives (2004) *Participation in the PREGP* [Internet]. Tbilisi, PSI. Available from: <<http://www.psigeorgia.org/pregp/>> [Accessed 3 July 2005].

REC Caucasus (2001a) *Involvement of Caucasian NGOs in the 'Environment for Europe' Process* [Internet], January, Analytical review. Available from: <http://www.rec-caucasus.org/anal_rev_rus.htm> [Accessed 5 July 2005].

REC Caucasus (2001b) *South Caucasus Environmental NGO Needs Assessment* [Internet], Tbilisi, REC Caucasus. Available from: <<http://www.rec.org/recc/NgoNeedsRus.zip>> [Accessed 4 July 2005].

Stepanian, A (2003) *Building Democracy in Georgia: Human Rights in Georgia, The Status of Minorities and Inter Ethnic Relations in Georgia. Discussion Paper 6. Armenia, International IDEA, "Printinfo" JV LLC.*

Sumbadze, N. & Tarkhan-Mouravi, G. (2003) *Public Opinion in Tbilisi: In the Aftermath of the Parliamentary Elections of November 2, 2003*. Tbilisi, Institute for Policy Studies. Available from: <http://www.psigeorgia.org/undpsa/files/IPS_Survey_Nov%202003.pdf> [Accessed 24 June 2005].

Sumbadze, N. (2003) *Building Democracy in Georgia: Developing a Democratic Community in Georgia, Civic Participation in Public and Political Life*. Discussion Paper 7. Armenia, International IDEA, "Printinfo" JV LLC.

Sepashvili, G., (2005) *PACE Endorses Critical Resolution on Georgia. Online Magazine - Civil Georgia* [Internet], January. Available from: <<http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8876>> [Accessed 4 June 2005].

Sesiashvili, I. (2005) *One Year of the Commander-in-chief 25.01.2004 _25.01.2005: Results of the President's actions monitoring in the military sphere*, Tbilisi: Association Justice and Freedom, unpublished work.

Transparency International. (2005) *Transparency International* [Internet]. Available from: <<http://www.transparency.org/>> [Accessed 21 June 2005].

Tsereteli, N. (2004) *The Issue of Decentralization – the Challenge for NGOs. Online Magazine - Civil Georgia (OM-CG)*, January 12. Available from: <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article_ngo.php?id=7752> [Accessed 23 June 2005].

Tevzadze, V. (2005) *Public Access to Information is Still a Problem in Georgia. 24Hours*, 22 July, p.A1.

Tilstone, V. (2003) Community Mobilization Impacts in East Georgia. *The Bridge*. [Internet] Second Quarter, 3, pp.7-11. Available from:<<http://www.mercycorps.org/items/1477>> [Accessed 30 June 2005].

Zurabishvili, D. (2003) *Building Democracy in Georgia: Human Rights in Georgia, Freedom of Confession and Religious Minorities in Georgia*. Discussion Paper 6. Armenia, International IDEA, "Printinfo" JV LLC.

UNDP (2005) *UNDP* [Internet]. Available from: <http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_126_1_1.html> [Accessed 25 June 2005].

WDI-World Development Indicators (2004) *World Development Indicators* [Internet], Available from: < <http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/> > [Accessed 25 June 2005].

WBG– Data and Statistics (2005) *World Bank Group – Data and Statistics* [Internet] WBG. Available from:< <http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinebases/onlinebases.html> > [Accessed 25 June 2005].

WID (2003) *Gender Matters*. Gender Assessment for USAID/Caucasus. Tbilisi, The Women in Development (WID).

West GCMI (2004) *Final Newsletter*. [Internet]. Available from:< http://www.west-gcmi.care.org.ge/pdf/wgcmi_newsletter_issue9_geo.pdf> [Accessed 23 June 2005].